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This dissertation investigates the manager motivations
involved in the participation of White Knights
corporate control contests.
viz.

(i)

and

(iii)

it

The three

is a subsequent bid

,

(ii)

it follows a hostile bid,

(WKs)

in

features of WK bids,
it

is a

friendly bid

combine uniquely to

provide the context for varying bidding motivations of WK
managers relative to the hostile bidders

(HBs).

An analysis

of the sequence of bidding in these contests reveals a
category called HHW WKs who make their bid after two
consecutive bids by the HB,
time

in doing so.

and tend to take relatively more

The non-HHW WKs make their bid in

relative haste after the first HB bid.
for which statistical evidence
to be much more pervasive,
economic magnitudes,

Overpayments by WKs,

is documented,

are observed

and of considerably greater

for non-HHW WKs.

The managers of HHW

WKs are thus more likely to be firm value maximizers;

any

observed overpayments could be the result of hubris or the
winner's curse.

However,

the managers of non-HHW WKs may

not be maximizing firm value through their bids,
absence of proper ex-ante incentive alignments
minimizing agency conflicts.

implying an

for

These managers may thus have a

lower proportion of annual expected income from their
separate holdings of stock and stock options relative to
their annual cash compensation
OP respectively).

(defined as variables COM and

An examination of the structure of

compensation packages of managers reveals that COM is
for non-HHW WKs as compared to HHW WKs.

OP is unable to

directly distinguish between non-HHW WKs and HHW WKs.
OP

(as well as COM)

HBs.

Further,

lower

Yet,

are lower for non-HHW WKs relative to

neither COM nor OP is able to differentiate

between HHW WKs and HBs.
firm value maximizers,

Thus,

if HBs are considered as

then HHW WKs are likely to be

governed by similar motivations.

In contrast,

size

maximization goals leading to higher proportions of cash
compensation for their managers may dominate the acquisition
activity of non-HHW WKs.
agency conflicts,

External monitoring to limit

as proxied by relative debt levels,

also lower for non-HHW WKs.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Corporate Control Contests
When a firm makes a hostile bid for a target firm with

a tender offer at a premium over the market price,

the

ensuing contest is primarily one between the managers of the
two firms

for control of the target's assets.

While the

bidding firm is perceived to be motivated by possible future
synergistic gains consistent with firm value maximization,
the motives of the target managers in resisting the bid are
not clear.

On the one hand,

by resisting the offer,

target

managers may be delaying the acquisition in order to attract
higher bids

for larger gains to its stockholders.1

On the

other hand,

their desire for retention of full control over

the target firm's assets can dominate their obligation to
find the best possible value

for investment in the shares of

their firm.2
Both of these seemingly contradictory motivations of
the target managers can be largely reconciled with the entry
of a White Knight
from its role

(WK)

in the contest.

in "rescuing"

The term

Yet,

"evil"

'White

friendly bid.

invited by the target into the bidding

process or enters
clear.

(HB).

clearly implies that the WK bid is a

Whether a WK is

its name

the target firm from the

clutches of the hostile bidder
Knight'

The WK gets

there

it of its own volition is not always
is little doubt that such a bid enables

the target managers to have the

"best of both the worlds".

These managers are likely to partially retain control
because the WK takeover bid is friendly,

and by definition,

has been made with the consent of the target.3

The

managers also fulfil their fiduciary duty by facilitating
the payment of a substantial premium to their principals,
the stockholders,

since the WK has to bid a higher value for

the target in order to succeed in making the acquisition.
Though stockholders of the target may have suffered an
opportunity loss

in as much as other bidders are frightened

away by the entry of the WK,4 this loss can never be
directly ascertained.

The empirical evidence will thus

record only the realized gains of target stockholders
bidding situations,
Grundfest

(1988),

as directly recorded by Black and

and detailed in the reviews of the merger

studies conducted by Jensen and Ruback
Brickley and Netter
Thus,

in all

(1983),

and Jarrell,

(1988).

faced with a hostile tender offer,

the

motivations of the target managers in inviting a WK to
acquire their firm in a subsequent friendly bid seem clear.
However,

the motivations of the WK managers

bid are not that apparent.

in making their

On the positive side,

it is

feasible that the WK managers are in the process of
implementing a capital acquisition strategy for their firm.
The besieged target is
potential

identified as one having the

of additional gains because of the

2

friendly nature

of the acquisition; this rationale will justify the premium
over the pre-existing HB bid.

Potential synergies can also

motivate the desire of WK managers to establish a closer
relationship with the target by obtaining a large equity
stake in the firm in a friendly manner,
controlling interest.5

In these ex-ante situations,

managers act in their principals'
However,

without acquiring
the WK

best interest.

there can also exist non firm-value maximizing

manager motivations for the WK bid.

The WK's late entry

into the bidding process, made with relative haste after the
first HB bid, may indicate a lack of careful scrutiny of the
target.

Also,

there is no obvious explanation,

with stockholder wealth maximization,

consistent

for the preference of

WK managers to risk a contested bid instead of going in for
a preemptive friendly bid

(Lofthouse,

1984).6

As an

example of possible non firm-value maximizing scenarios for
WK bids,

the WK manager may have access to "free" cash flow

(Jensen,

1986) ,7 which can be used to make a WK acquisition

which is a suboptimal investment.

Alternatively,

despite

the non-firm value maximizing nature of the WK acquisition,
the managers may be keen to increase their personal power
through growth and higher turnovers
1988,

1989).

(Shleifer and Vishny,

Another possibility can be the WK managers'

implementation of their own antitakeover strategies.

This

will entail expanding to a level where the probability of a
future HB bid against their firm becomes lower.

3

Such a

strategy will

further ensure that they retain their control

over the firm's assets.
all these alternatives

Significantly,
is the non

the common feature of

firm-value maximizing

behavior on the part of the WK managers.
The divergent motivations

for WK bids are not

inconsistent with reports of takeover activity in the
summary studies by Jensen and Ruback
Brickley and Netter
results

(1988),

for bidders.

(1983)

and Jarrell,

which do not find consistent

There does,

however,

seem to be

unanimity of opinion regarding the trends.
When present,

gains to bidders have never been large in

percentage terms

(Jensen and Ruback,

1983).

the earlier studies found losses to bidders

Some of
(Dodd,

1980).
Commencing with the conglomerate mergers of the
sixties,
returns
1988),

there has been a trend toward negative bidder
in the eighties

(Jarrell,

Brickley,

& Netter,

and the losses have been found to be

statistically significant

(Black,

1989).

The existence and extent of positive and negative
bidder returns has been study specific,
the sample and event window examined.
questioned the

depending on
Roll

(1986)

interpretability of the results

has

for

narrow event windows because of the possibility that
the market reacts when acquisition strategies are
announced by bidders prior to the bid rather than

4

during the

announcement

The higher

incidence

of

the

continue

In

fact,

(Bradley,

Desai

Typically,
targets.
where

are

and

observed

and Kim,

Therefore,

the

have

Since
the

ascertain the
analysis
of

is

small

late bidder acquirers

larger than

into

large dollar gains

for targets

(Dennis

and

1986).

evidence,
reasons

cannot be

researchers have

for possible

late bidders with additional

engage

successful

positive bidder returns,

translated

especially contextual

collaborative

in

found to be

overpayment by bidders

empirical

are

in multiple

1988).

comparable to dollar gains
McConnell,

increase

in the

significant negative

bidders have been

existing,

an

first bidders who

to make gains

return reactions

bid.

of wealth reducing bids

eighties has been ascribed to
bidding.

actual

features.

in overpayment

WKs

out

from

attempted to

overpayment.
for WKs,

who

This
are

a

subset

target connected

are

and be

ruled

accordingly more

responsible

likely to

for negative bidder

returns.8
In the

literature,

overpayment by bidding
be

faithful

(1986)
target,
In a

to the goal

contends
managers

that

there
firms'
of

are

rationalizations

managers who

are perceived to

firm value maximization.

in their enthusiasm to

of bidding

of

acquire the

firms may overpay due

slightly different vein,

Varaiya

5

and

Roll

Ferris

to hubris.
(1987)

posit that managers of bidding

firms mistakenly overbid to

increase the probability of their winning the contest
because they are afflicted by the

"winner's curse".

Both

these explanations give the benefit of the doubt to the
bidding manager and are perfectly compatible with the
complete alignment of manager-stockholder interests and the
goal of

firm value maximization.

rationales,

According to these

the overpayment by the managers of the bidding

firm is not deliberate.
Other explanations of overpayment are not as charitable
to the managers of bidding

firms.

the availability of

cash

"free"

Jensen

(1986)

mentions

flows as providing

incentives to the managers to undertake suboptimal
investments or bad acquisitions
these

instead of distributing

funds to the stockholders.

state that manager goals
different
from the

Managers pay additionally

flow for fulfilling their own goals

which do not necessarily benefit stockholders;
reflected as the overpayment
bidding

firm.

(1988)

in acquisition may be quite

from stockholder goals.
firm's cash

Shleifer and Vishny

this

is

in the stock price of the

These theories are based on the premise that

agency conflicts existing between managers and stockholders
play out

in value-decreasing acquisitions;

by managers of bidding

firms can be deliberate.

If WK managers often overpay
acquire,

thus overpayment

for the targets they

we need to identify scenarios where the overpayment

6

is likely to be deliberate,
not.

For the purpose,

First,

and other situations where it is

we follow a two pronged approach.

we look for differences

in the abnormal

returns

profiles of groups of WKs based upon certain characteristics
of their bids.

As we posit in the next section,

partition of WKs can be based on their position
sequence of bids
Next,

such a
in the

for the target.

we seek to separate WKs

into two groups:

those

WKs where the managers are motivated to maximize stockholder
wealth,

and other WKs where the managers are not so

motivated.

To this end,

we make use of the principle that

managers who do not act in a manner which maximizes
value will be disciplined by the labor market;
such a discipline

We also know that on an ex-ante

such discipline can be

imposed on managers through

the use of stock based incentives
contracts.

the threat of

is expected to act as a deterrence to

aberrant manager behavior.
basis,

firm

Systematic

in their compensation

incentive related differences

in the

compensation contracts of WK managers can thus lead us to
conclude that WKs whose managers have an effective

incentive

structure

likely to

in their compensation contracts are more

be unintentional,

rather than intentional

overpayers.

Based on the partition in the preceding paragraph,

we

neod to examine the compensation contracts of the relative
managers

to

identity whether the overpayment by the wk

managers

is deliberate or not.

7

Further,

if this partition

is observed to be correlated with the partition of WKs based
upon their position in the sequence of bids

(which is

posited to lead to differentiated abnormal returns
profiles),

we can directly identify unintentional

from amongst WKs

overpayers

from the timing of their entry into the

control contest reflected in the sequence of bids.

The need

to investigate compensation contracts will then become
redundant,

and manager motivations can be directly

ascertained from the sequence of bids and abnormal return
profiles.

Overall,

this study is expected to contribute

significantly to the understanding of manager motivations
anticipating,

initiating,

in

and reacting to processes which

intend to change existing control over corporate assets.
1.2

The Study
In order to accomplish our objectives,

we have

investigated the market reaction to WK stock prices

in time

intervals between the various bids of the HB and the WK in
the context of the sequence of the different bids
contests involving WKs.
premise that in a

in control

Our approach is based on the

firm value maximizing environment where

the interests of the stockholder and the manager are
completely aligned for all bidders,

a bid

bid with greater chances of overpayment)

(especially a late
requires a detailed

appraisal of the value of the target to the bidder.
because of the timing of their entry,

Also,

managers of potential

late entry bidders may like to follow a cautious approach by

8

observing the playing out of the contest before moving in
with their bid,

if only to have additional

information on

the attractiveness of the target to the HB.

One way to

exhibit this caution will be to look for a higher bid by the
HB when its first bid is rejected.9
(called HHW WKs because their bid
bids

(HH)

from the same HB)

Indeed,

(W)

some WKs

comes after two HB

do seem to act in this manner.

Overpayment in their case is significantly lower than most
other situations where the WKs enter the contest relatively
quickly

(compared to the HHW WKs)

after the HB bid.

Also,

about one in every two HHW WKs has a positive abnormal
return during the bid.

However,

only one

in seven White

Knights has a positive abnormal return during their bid if
they do not display the HHW feature.

The returns profile

for the HHW WKs thus seem to be similar to the overall
returns profile of bidding firms

from other studies?

this

is

not the case with the returns profile of the non-HHW WKs.
The above indications lead us to suggest that managers
of HHW WKs are more likely to be firm value maximizers.
Even if they do end up overpaying,

intentional.

In contrast,

it is unlikely to be

managers of the non-HHW WKs are

more likely to have anticipated overpayment or initiated a
downward revision in the market's expectations of the firm's
future cash flows.
Our view in this regard is reinforced when we
investigate a third type of bidding sequence called

9

Alternating Sequential Bidding
only bid is the successful bid.
not HHW WKs),
WK's

importantly,

For most WKs,

However,

for some

their

(who are

the HB comes back with a higher bid after the

first bid.

overbid until

(ASBs).

In all

these cases,

it succeeds

the WK continues to

in acquiring the target.

each of the subsequent WK bids

More

is additionally

value reducing in contrast to subsequent HB bids which have
no impact on the stock price of the HB.
The partition of the WKs based on their position in the
bidding sequence gives a reasoned indication that the nonHHW group of WKs
overpayer.

is more likely to be an intentional

More directly,

unlikely to be a

an intentional

firm value maximizer.

overpays deliberately and yet survives,

overpayer is

If a manager
we suggest that the

various market mechanisms available to discipline such
managers

(stated below)

must be ineffectual.

disciplinary measures of the market are as

The available

follows:

External Mechanisms

Managerial

labor market.

Hostile tender offer.

Internal Mechanisms

-

Structure of managerial compensation packages.

10

If the external mechanisms
effective,

(outlined above)

are

then managers of WK firms who are considered to

be involved in non firm value maximizing activity can expect
to be disciplined through the managerial labor market or
through a hostile takeover bid for the WK.

However,

there

is little empirical evidence of efficiency in the managerial
labor market,

primarily because valuation of the intangible

human capital of managers is very difficult.

Disciplining

through hostile tender offers may also not be effective,10
because the WK acquisition strategy can itself play the role
of an antitakeover device and avoid the disciplining
mechanism of hostile takeovers in the future.
WK acquisition,

A successful

by increasing size, makes it less likely

(from the resource standpoint)

that the WK will be the

subject of a future HB bid.
On the internal side,

the disciplining mechanism works

through the stockholders opting to align the interests of
their managers with themselves by providing suitable
incentives in the managerial compensation packages so as to
minimize aberrant manager behavior.
literature

(reviewed in chapter 2)

financial economics,

accounting,

There is a large body of
originating from

and management which

collectively demonstrates that managerial ownership of stock
and stock options helps to reduce agency conflicts,
the interests of managers and stockholders,

aligns

and even

favorably affects investment and financing decisions.
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We

posit,

then,

that managers who do not have such incentives

on an ex-ante basis are more likely to perform in a non firm
value maximizing way

(and the converse also holds true),

this can be examined ex-post in the case of WKs.

and

If the

proposed acquisition by the WK leads to a maximization of
the manager's own utility function,
being an intentional overpayer.

then he/she can end up

The non firm value

maximizing behavior may be at little personal cost to the
manager because of the inadequate alignment of incentives in
the compensation package.

Additionally,

there may be

personal benefits in the form of "entrenchment" through
acquisition

(Shleifer and Vishny,

1989).

In this

connection,

the existence of leverage can also lead to the

institution of internal monitoring mechanisms through bond
indentures.

These can restrict the amount of "free" cash

flow available to managers,

and be a general disincentive to

non firm-value maximizing actions by the managers of the WK
firms.
There are no absolute standards for the proportion of
stock and stock options in compensation packages which will
completely eliminate agency conflicts.

However, we consider

whether the incidence of stock and stock options in
compensation packages are significantly higher in the case
of the HBs and HHW WKs where interests of stockholders and
managers seem to be more aligned, when contrasted with the
managers of non-HHW WKs.

If such a hypothesis is
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empirically well-founded,

it will support our original

contention that managers of HHW WKs are more likely to be
value maximizers pursuing strategies supportive of the
objectives of the firm.

In contrast, managers of non-HHW

WKs will possibly exhibit non-value maximizing behavior when
making their bid.
In conducting our study on the extent of managerial
ownership in compensation packages, we separately consider
stock options.

Stock options are usually ignored in the

compensation literature because of difficulties in
valuation.

Also,

stock options have undergone a large

number of changes over the years discouraging meaningful
inter-year comparisons.

Another reason for historically

excluding stock options is the tax benefit of these options
to the firm and the manager which dominated any incentive
effects

(Miller and Scholes,

1981).

In our comparison of the

proportion of stock and stock options to total compensation,
both the groups

(HB and WK)

the control contests.

appear in the same time frame of

As such,

tax consequences,

in the nature of the option plans,
any intertemporal marginal effects.

or changes

are not likely to have
Our approach to the

valuation stock options is laid out in chapter 4.
The structure of the rest of the dissertation is as
follows.
detail.

Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature in
Chapter 3 explains the bidding situations regarding

the WK bids and defines the various hypotheses of the study.
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Chapter 4 provides details of the data and methodology.
Chapter 5 discusses both the results of testing the
hypotheses regarding bidding behavior,

implications for managerial motivation.

and their
Chapter 5 further

discusses the results of testing the hypothesis relating to
managerial motivation.

Chapter 6 provides a summary of the

findings and reviews the contribution of the study.
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ENDNOTES

1.

Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) state that "the ...
benefit of resistance comes when resistance by target
management helps promote a takeover auction.
... This
auction rationale for resistance is harder to reject
statistically." - p 58.

2.

Dann and DeAngelo (1988), in a study of antitakeover
defenses launched by target firms in response to
hostile bids (responsive restructuring), find that
such strategies were generally detrimental to the
stockholder wealth of targets, presumably because of
the managerial control retention features involved.
However, a successful takeover by the hostile bidder or
a competing bidder results in a wealth gain for target
stockholders.

3.

The role, if any, of investment bankers in bringing the
managers of the WK and the target together does not
vitiate the basic premises of the situation.

4.

The theoretical model of Shleifer and Vishny (1986),
discussed in chapter 2, is based on such a scenario.

5.

In this situation, the subsequent friendly bidder is
called a White Squire to distinguish it from a White
Knight who would seek to acquire controlling interest
in the target firm. A White Squire participates in the
antitakeover maneuver of the target firm to deter the
HB from pursuing its bid any further, while enabling
the target firm to retain its independent existence.
Since White Squires do not commit themselves to acquire
the target, valuation consequences of their bids are
likely to be different from those of other similarly
placed firms who do seek to exercise complete control
over the target through acquisition, viz. White
Knights.

6.

We do not rule out the possibility of premiums offered
in friendly WK bids being of the same magnitude as
those offered in preemptive friendly mergers. This
situation presupposes that potential synergistic gains
to the hostile bidder (HB) are considerably lower than
those (gains) to the WK.
Thus, the WK can effectively
ignore the prior bid of the HB, and the HB has no scope
of topping the WK bid.
However, such wide disparities
in valuations are relatively unlikely.
Also, in such a
situation, since the target is already in play, the WK
in the firm value maximization mode may prefer not to
'give away' the entire gains to the target.
15

7.

These are surplus, unrestrained (by bond indentures)
cash flows under the control of managers, which are not
distributed to shareholders despite the absence of
positive net present value avenues of investment.

8.

Negative bidder returns during the event period
represent overpayment because they may be assumed to
cause an equivalent downward revision in the
expectations of future cash flow due to the event in
the event time methodology framework.

9.

The HB, which is presumed to have thoroughly evaluated
the target firm, usually decides upon a range over
which it will bid. If it makes more than one bid, a
better estimate is likely to be available of the upper
end of the range.
If it does not, the first bid may be
perceived to have largely exhausted the range. Because
of the costs incurred in assessing the target, the HB
would probably come back with another bid if it could
do so within its predetermined range.

10.

The issue is addressed by Mitchell and Lehn
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(1990).

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE SURVEY

In this survey, we review some representative papers
with a key bearing on the issues relevant to our study.
Since we initially use cumulative abnormal returns of
bidders under the market model
chapter 4)

(explained in detail in

for providing support to our hypotheses, we start

the survey by briefly reviewing the history of research on
cumulative abnormal returns of bidding firms.
2.1 Bidder Returns in Merger Studies
As Jensen and Ruback (1983)

aptly summarize,

research

on mergers has conclusively shown that the shareholders of

target firms obtain significantly positive abnormal returns
as a result of successful takeover activity.1

However,

this outcome for targets has not been duplicated for
stockholders of bidding firms, who do not get significantly
large and positive abnormal returns during their bid.
Jarrell,

Brickley,

and Netter

(1988)

sample of bidding firms by decade,

have stratified the

and reported that

significant positive excess returns for bidding firms in the
1960s and the 1970s

(Jensen and Ruback,

1983)

have been

replaced by insignificant negative excess returns to bidders
in the 1980s.

Bradley,

Desai and Kim

(1988)

seek to explain

the phenomenon of insignificant average bidder returns
through the increased incidence of multiple bids in the
1980s.

However,

as Roll

(1988)

mentions,

it has never

become quite clear why the gains from mergers shall accrue
so overwhelmingly

(at least in percentage terms)

to targets

instead of being more equitably divided between bidders and
targets.2
Black

(1989)

in 1987 and 1988,3

summarizes all studies on bidder returns
and finds a preponderance of negative

abnormal returns to bidders over a short event window of one
to four days,

as well as over longer event windows.

certainly possible that over the decades,

It is

a structural

change has been occurring in bidder performance during
takeover bids,

putting increasing pressure on the already

slim share of takeover gains in the first place,
cases,

perhaps wiping out gains altogether.

and in some

Hostile bids,

ushered in 1974,4 caused increased competition for takeover
of target firms through multiple bids.
Black

(1989)

conjectures,

Additionally,

as

the greater induction of private

bidders in the 1980s due to an increased incidence of
leveraged buyouts and management buyouts etc.

can

potentially affect the studies covering this period with a
selection bias,

since private bidders are excluded from

these studies for data considerations.
If we accept Roll's

(1986)

view,

the outcome of long¬

term strategy implementation by bidders is reflected in
bids.

These bids are therefore likely to be anticipated by

the market. Market reaction may thus be forthcoming only to
information regarding the prospective strategy,
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and not to

the actual implementation of the strategy effected through
bids.

Additionally,

the partially anticipated nature of the

event

(Schipper and Thomson,

1983)

makes the event study

with insufficiently large windows prior to the bid an
inadequate tool to measure the impact of the event through
an estimation of the relative abnormal return.5
these two factors unique to bidder returns viz.

Because of
the gap

between the formulation and implementation of strategy and
the partially anticipated nature of the event,

there is the

risk of making incorrect inferences from the event-related
returns.
In a discussion of the wide variation in the evidence
regarding bidder returns. Roll
on the paper,

the sample,

(1988)

the period,

states that "depending
and the biases of the

reader, widely differing conclusions can be reached."
evidence, while seeming to be at a dead end,

The

also indicates

an opportunity if it is perceived to imply that there exist
subsets of bidders which, while differing among themselves
in the pattern of abnormal returns during takeover bids
(leading to the mixed evidence),

exhibit considerably more

homogeneity within each individual subset.

Some of these

subsets will have to exhibit negative abnormal returns
representing overpayment more pervasively

for the overall

average for bidders to correspond to the documented
evidence.
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Existing research shows progress in identifying the
characteristics of some such subsets.
Waegelein

(1987)

Tehranian,

Travlos &

demonstrate that firms with long-term

performance linked compensation plans are likely to
experience a more favorable market reaction to their
acquisition proposals.

The possibility of a negative

abnormal return for bidders increases with stock financing
of acquisitions
(Amihud,
(1989)

(Travlos,

Lev and Travlos,

1987)

and low managerial ownership

1990).

Lang,

Stulz and Walkling

document evidence that bidders with poor abnormal

returns have a low Tobin's Q6
performance).

Morck,

(a proxy for firm

Shleifer and Vishny

(1990)

state that

abnormal returns exhibited by bidding firms are lower when
they diversify or look for a rapidly growing target,

or when

the performance of their managers prior to the acquisition
is considered to be poor.

Jarrell and Poulsen

(1989)

that the abnormal returns to the bidder are lower
bidder has to pay a higher premium)

show

(the

if the size of the

target is smaller relative to the bidder.
2.2 Reasons for Possible Overpayment by Bidders
Jarrell,

Brickley and Netter

(1988)

ascribe the change

in the direction of abnormal bidder returns in the 1980s to
the increased incidence of multiple bidding which lead to
higher target premiums,
returns.

and,

as a consequence,

lower bidder

According to them, multiple bidding has been

encouraged in the 1980s by disclosure and delay rules
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imposed by Federal and State regulations,
protecting defensive tactics,
against takeovers
pills'),

(like

court rulings

the invention of new defenses

'fair price amendments'

and

'poison

and the presence of sophisticated takeover advisers

to implement the defenses.
explain why the abnormal

However,

none of these reasons

return for the bidder will be

negative.
Roll

(1986)

rationales

and Varaiya and Ferris

for unintentional

tender offers.7

(1987)

offer

overpayment by bidders

in

Roll's theory is based on manager optimism

and uncertainty about value.

In his analysis,

the existence

of an active market in the item being valued makes takeover
bids different from other types of bids where there is a
symmetry between the buyer and seller regarding valuation.
Because the value of the target is uncertain,
of the bidders

the valuation

is likely to be distributed in a manner such

that the expected value is the current market price of the
target.

However,

since no bid is made if the valuation is

below the market price of the target,

samples of bidding

situations are not random and represent positive errors
valuation.

Thus,

there remains a high probability of

overpayment even if markets are strong-form efficient.
when making their bids,

Yet,

managers seem to be afflicted with

excessive optimism or hubris
a

in

in presuming that their bid is

fair bid.
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Varaiya and Ferris

(1987)

base their reasoning on

manager ignorance and the "winner's curse".

Their analysis

is also based on wide fluctuations in valuation of the
target.

The "winner's curse" hypothesis

Campbell,

1971)

(Capen,

Clapp and

states that in any bidding situation where

the value of the object being bid for is uncertain,

a party

that unknowingly overestimates the value of a given object
tends to bid higher than its competitors,
likely to win it.

Mathematically,

and is thus more

Oren and Williams

(1975)

have shown that when the winning bidder's estimates are
correct on average,

the estimated expected value of the

object won is greater than its ultimate expected value.
Thus,

in a takeover bidding situation,

the winner tends to

be the bidder who most overestimates the value of the
target.
theory,

Although this approach is similar to Roll's hubris
the winner's curse approach emphasizes the higher

probability of success when the value of the target is
overestimated.
An alternative explanation of bidder behavior can be

intentional non-value maximizing behavior by managers of the
bidding firm.
regard,

There are at least two theories

in this

arising out of agency conflicts between managers and

stockholders.

Shleifer and Vishny

(1988,

1989)

state that

managers may display such conduct due to their strong
preference

for the status-quo,

and promote self-entrenchment

by investing in businesses they are presently running,
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irrespective of the effect the acquisition may have on the
value of the firm.8

In these cases,

managers do not

overpay because they make mistakes out of ignorance
(winner's curse)

or enthusiasm

(hubris).

Rather,

they make

an overpayment for the benefits of the acquisition that they
care about but the shareholders do not e.g.
size of the firm,
employment risk,
Jensen's

(1986)

increasing the

diversifying the firm to minimize their
making themselves less replaceable etc.

theory of free cash flow suggests that

managers of firms having access to unrestricted excess cash
flows

(due to the absence of positive net present value

projects)

manifest their divergence of interests with the

stockholders by making value reducing acquisitions

instead

of distributing the excess cash to the stockholders.
2.3 White Knight

(WK)

Behavior

2.3.1 Theoretical Studies
Giammarino and Heinkel

(1986)

have constructed a

theoretical model of dynamic takeover behavior based upon
asymmetric information among participants regarding the
synergy gain from the takeover.
called the ''informed'' bidder,

Here,

the first bidder,

possesses potentially superior

information about the synergistic gains,

which is not

available to the target or another "uninformed" bidder
(here)

called the WK.

disadvantage,

To overcome the informational

the WK is structured with some tactical

advantages so that it can enter the bidding and impose
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competitive discipline on the informed bidder.

These

advantages accrue from specific sequential structures
imposed by the model on the bidding process.

In particular,

the WK is aware of the information set of signals of the
informed bidder and it is accorded the privilege of making
the last bid.
consequences,

The model has,

as one of the equilibrium

potential overpayment by the "uninformed" WK

in acquiring the target at a cost in excess of the realized
synergy gains.

However,

the model is based upon sequential

bidding where no single bidder can successively bid more
than once.

This does not always occur in multiple bidding

situations for corporate acquisitions.

Besides,

the model

compels the WK to bid last to compensate for informational
asymmetry;

it further assumes that the extent of synergy

gain is common to all bidders, which is unlikely to be valid
in reality.
In contrast,
and Vishny

(1986b)

the sequential bidding model of Shleifer
models the WK as an antitakeover defense

and provides a rationale for payment of "greenmail" in the
context of target shareholder value maximization.
model,

In their

the target's access to the WK is the only source of

asymmetric information between the parties in the takeover
contest.

They posit that the presumption of the existence

of a WK makes potential subsequent bidders shy away from a
control contest.
controlled,

The WKs'

to some extent,

entry into the contest is
by the target's managers who
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possess private information about the source of gains from a
takeover by the WK.

The WK can thus have synergistic gains

only if the cooperation of the target management is
available.

The information regarding the inability of the

target managers to identify a WK is a signal which is
revealed to the market

(and to other potential bidders)

through payment of "greenmail” to the HB.

Other prospective

bidders are thus no longer deterred by the possible
existence of a WK,

and incur costs to acquire information to

make higher bids for the target.

Thus,

if the target feels

that the first bidder's bid is not adequate,

and other

bidders are not incurring costs of acquiring information and
coming forward to bid because they apprehend that a WK is
waiting in the wings,

then the target will either inform the

market of the absence of a WK or conceal the WK's existence
by paying "greenmail",
bid.

Otherwise,

thereby encouraging other bidders to

only the first bidder and the WK will

participate in the auction process.

In this model,

the WK is

not structured to overpay due to the existence of specific
potential synergies in a WK acquisition.

Also,

hostile

tender offers can result in one of two scenarios:
payment of "greenmail" followed by further bids,
acquisition by a WK.

the
or

The analysis is not exhaustive since a

number of hostile tender offers have resulted in the
acquisition of the target firm without payment of
"greenmail" or WK intervention.
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Both of the models discussed above assume that managers
act in the best interests of the respective stockholders.
Yet,

this may not necessarily be true in the light of agency

conflicts between managers and stockholders.
2.3.2 Empirical Studies
There has been only one published study till now which
explicitly deals with White Knights
Stewart

(1985)

Smiley and

look at a sample of 44 tender offers over the

period 1972-1978 that involve WKs.
as a group,

(WKs).

They conclude that WKs,

do not earn significant abnormal returns before

or after a tender offer.

Firms that choose to become WKs in

contested takeover bids come from different industries but
have substantially higher leverage and lower cash turnover
than other control firms.

Unlike WKs that fail, WKs that

succeed systematically belong to industries that have
performed better in the previous five years.

There is some

indication that faced with poor industry performance, WKs
seek to diversify out of the industry.

Smiley and Stewart do

not state either their sources or the criteria used for
their sample of WKs.

By inference,

their WKs seem to be

second bidders who are inducted by investment bankers into
the takeover battle,

independent of final outcome.

The

authors also use monthly data in an event study framework,
which makes it considerably more difficult to capture firm
specific events and interpret the effect of the dynamic
market processes pertaining to these contests.
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Mikkelson and Ruback (1985a),

in a study of the

interfirm equity investment process,

document additional

positive abnormal returns to shareholders of first bidders
on subsequent bids by "third parties" which will presumably
also flow to the shareholders of the target.

Though not

explicitly identified as such, WK bids will be a subset of
such subsequent bids by "third parties".
Bradley,

Desai and Kim (BDK - 1988)

implicitly deal

with White Knights while focussing on multiple-bidder
contests in their study of all successful tender offer
contests between 1963 and 1984.9

They observe that

successful tender offers increase the combined value of
targets and acquiring firms by 7.4%.

Competition among

bidding firms increase the returns to targets and decrease
the return to acquirers.

Unlike the single bid acquirers,

multiple bid acquirers do not seem to earn significant
positive cumulative abnormal returns
date,

especially in the eighties.

(CARs)

BDK

around the event

(1988)

ascribe these

results for multiple bid acquirers to the laissez-faire
policies of the federal government,

the introduction of

sophisticated antitakeover tactics,

and the proliferation of

investment banking firms which specialized in raising funds
to finance takeovers.
On further investigation,

BDK (1988)

find that the

insignificant positive abnormal returns or negative abnormal
returns earned by multiple bidder acquirers can be ascribed
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to the significant negative CARs earned by "late bidder
acquirers, more commonly known as white knights."10

This

feature is contrasted to first bidder acquirers in multiple
bid contests, who earn a significant positive CAR.

It is

our view that the WK nature of a bid is not fully captured
by categorizing all late bidder acquirers as WKs.

Our

definition of a WK bid,

defined and explained at the

beginning of Chapter 4,

is considered to be more

representative of this category of bids.
2.4 Agency Theory and Negative Bidder Returns
Negative price reactions to acquirer bids do not,
themselves,

have to reflect conflict of interest.

in

Such

reactions can be explained by errors or differences of
opinion between managers with inside information and
stockholders without such information.

This asymmetry of

information between managers and stockholders results from
delegation of authority
Besides,

(Coughlan and Schmidt,

1985).

a fall in stock price does not necessarily indicate

that the manager benefitted.

On the contrary,

may also have suffered through stock ownership,

the manager
in which

case there will actually be an alignment of interests.
effective compensation plan,

An

if successful in aligning

interests, will require a movement in the same direction for
both the change in the stock price and the change in the
compensation.
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However,
bidders,

if the wealth reducing acquisitions of some

especially late bidders like WKs,

are indeed a

reflection of deliberate non firm-value maximizing behavior
of their managers,

a possible reason can be the inability of

available mechanisms to reduce agency conflicts and align
the interests of the managers with those of their
stockholders.

In this regard, Mikkelson and Ruback

(1985b)

mention that the following mechanisms are available to limit
management from pursuing its self-interest:
Efficient functioning of the managerial labor market.
Hostile tender offer in the market for corporate
control.
Compensation package aligning the interests of the
stockholders and managers.
The efficient managerial labor market theory

(Fama,

1980)

states that there exists an efficient market for executives.
Any action initiated by managers and perceived to be non
firm value maximizing promptly reduces the value of the
managers in the marketplace.
better internal monitoring,

However,

(1988)

limits the pursuit of

The efficacy of the hostile

tender offer is difficult to anticipate ex-ante.
and Lehn

(1990)

shows that

rather than the existence of an

external managerial labor market,
self-interest by managers.

Dyl

Mitchell

posit that there is a stronger likelihood

that bidders in value reducing acquisitions become targets
of hostile bids in future.

However,
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the empirical evidence

in this regard is not conclusive with a large number of
value reducing acquirers remaining as nontargets,

possibly

because a part of managerial self-interest also consists of
making the firm unattractive as a takeover target.
2.5 Manager Motivation Through Compensation
As stated above,

one of the ways to limit agency

conflict is to design appropriate compensation packages for
manager motivation and the alignment of manager-stockholder
interests.

As Coughlan and Schmidt

(1985)

point out,

compensation packages based exclusively on stock price
performance are inefficient methods for compensating riskaverse executives,

since stock price variation can be caused

by systematic risk factors outside the executives'

control.

Risk averse executives will demand compensation premiums to
neutralize the wide fluctuations in compensation that is
caused by these events.

On the other hand,

the introduction

of stock purchase plans,

though yielding positive abnormal

returns, may not be interpreted as being exclusively due to
a change in contracting which results in a better alignment
of manager stockholder interests
Lease,

1985).

(Bhagat,

The same phenomenon can,

Brickley and

as well,

be

explained as a signal of the management indicating better
future performance.
In the management literature
Finkelstein and Hambrick,

(Kerr and Bettis,

1987;

1989; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia,

1989),

a distinction is made between owner-controlled firms where a
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dominant stockholder controls more than 5% of the stock,

and

management-controlled firms where stock ownership is
dispersed.

Manager-owned firms are a subset of owner-

controlled firms where management holds more than 5% of the
stock and is thus one of the dominant stockholders.

The

owner in owner-controlled firms views the firm as an
investment and has the power and the incentive to reduce
agency conflict by aligning compensation of the managers to
performance of the firms.

As such,

executives in these

firms receive more compensation for performance and less for
the scale of operation than managers in managementcontrolled firms.

Managers in owner-controlled firms thus

have to bear more compensation risk.

There is a decoupling

of pay from performance for management controlled firms.
2.5.1 Compensation Structures
The literature relating to determinants of managerial
compensation is extensive,

stretching across practically all

disciplines in the social sciences.

At the outset,

we note

that a large number of studies have shown a strong
econometric association between firm size and managerial
compensation,

presumably because executives of bigger firms

oversee more resources,
pay,

large firms have more ability to

and there are more hierarchical layers in large firms

(Ciscel and Carroll,

1980).

However,

we are more concerned

here with the determinants of managerial compensation in so
far as they motivate managerial incentive issues through
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ownership of common stock and stock options.
Scholes

(1981)

As Miller and

point out in their study of the tax incentive

effects of compensation plans,

compensation solely in the

form of the firm's stock can make managers less willing to
undertake risky investments than the stockholders wish,

as

the managers will have to carry the total risk instead of
only the undiversifiable risk carried by the stockholders.
In contrast,

a manager's

incentives to adopt very risky

policies that stockholders are likely to reject will
obviously increase if compensation is solely in options
the

in

firm's shares than in the shares themselves.
Lewellen,

Loderer and Martin

(LLM -

1987)

conduct an

interesting study seeking to link managerial decisions with
the structure of managerial pay.

They highlight different

dimensions of the agency conflict and posit that varying
incentive features

in compensation contracts are motivated

by the need to solve diverse aspects of owner-manager
conflicts of interest.
compensation design,

Thus,

instead of a

formal model of

they look for the detection of

empirical regularities

in compensation structures that can

assist in explaining owner-manager agency relationship.
According to LLM

(1987),

the two issues

in the agency

problem of the manager are the time horizon problem

(viz.

that the executive does not have an infinite time horizon
like the stockholder)

and the risk exposure problem

(viz.

finding an optimal allocation of risk sharing between
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managers and stockholders).

Deferred compensation can

ameliorate the limited horizon problem of the managers;

yet

it can simultaneously increase their risk exposure by
increasing the share of managerial wealth tied to the future
financial health of the firm.
LLM

(1987)

contend that stock based pay,

variable claim on the firm's cash flows,

which is a

can deal with the

twin problems of underleveraging and underinvestment.

If

managers have a fixed claim on the firm's cash flows,

they

might tend to favor a lower level of indebtedness

for the

firm since debt will compete with their claims to the same
lower tail of the firm's cash flow distribution.

Also,

fixed income claims of the firm's managers predominate,
the firm's bankruptcy risk is non-zero,

if
and

the managers may

favor investment policies which reduce the variance of firm
value to reduce the personal risks they bear - even if those
policies lower the firm value.
based pay,

In contrast,

through stock

managers have title to part of the residual after

fixed claims have been met.

Potential underleverage

tendencies of management are thus addressed.

Stock based

compensation also does not provide the incentive to managers
to undertake investments that decrease share prices.
Further,

if the firm is levered,

such compensation to

managers will raise the payoff from variance-increasing
investments.
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However,

unlike other market investors,

managers cannot

easily diversify away the diversifiable risk of the firm
under their management.
claims,

Their stock-related compensation

together with direct holdings of the common shares

of their companies,

are likely to represent a substantial

portion of their personal wealth.

Therefore,

increasing the

percentage of stock-related compensation may actually make
management more reluctant to choose high variance investment
projects because a higher proportion of stock in their
compensation adds to their risk exposure.

In principle,

executives can counterbalance this effect by reducing their
existing holding of the firm's shares but this may be
considered as a bad signal by the market.
may be prohibited by their contracts

Further,

managers

from selling off their

holdings of the firm's stock before a predetermined time
interval.

Capital gains realizations can further inhibit

portfolio rebalancing by managers.

Managers will thus bear

increased firm specific risk as emphasis on stock related
forms of compensation rises.
LLM treat the problem of risk exposure as an empirical
issue and find that the incentive effects of higher variance
of stock returns and higher levels of debt overwhelm the
increased personal portfolio risk exposure
of the manager.

(diversifiable)

Empirical evidence reveals that stock based

pay effectively prevents excessively conservative investment
policies.
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Jensen

and Murphy

compensation

(1990)

investigate the

in aligning manager-stockholder

influence

interests by

estimating the extent to which compensation policy
form of performance based bonuses,

actually provides value

to managers.

They

in

$3.25

in the wealth of the

This

shareholder wealth results

empirical

considered

remuneration
thus

relation,

small
is

Such a model

executive has

incentives

surpluses

of

to huge bonuses
In actual
and their costs
those

and

role,

a

for

is

and

is

of optimal

risk neutral

stockholder wealth
100%

limited

of the
However,

resources

large negative

shareholders

the managers

are

cannot

realizations

cannot credibly commit

that amount to giving away the
practice,

(CEO).

in conformity with this model

firms

are not

firm.
risk neutral,

of bearing risk are considerably higher than

of widely diffused

diversified portfolios.
executives

important

such activity.

since executives with

firm performance,

of only

incentive

postulates that

to pursue

of

significant,

agency model

arising out of

credibly commit to pay

increase

increase

only when he/she gets

pay-performance contracts
feasible

formal

and

incentives

Chief Executive Officer

expected to play an

contracting.

not

in an

for an occupation where

maximizing activities

an

while positive and

inconsistent with the

marginal

increasing

find that on average,

$1000

in the

salary revisions

stock options

of

to take

shareholders holding wellThus,

requiring these

actions which will
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risk-averse

enable them to get

100% of the marginal profits in risky projects

(in terms of

an optimal agency model of incentive contracting)
them to unacceptably large risks.

subjects

On the contrary,

if the

primacy among firm goals is shifted from stockholder wealth
maximization to efficient risk sharing by way of transfer of
risk from managers to stockholders,

then executives can be

given contracts where they will get only a fraction of the
marginal surpluses arising out of their performance.

But

this will generate agency costs because the executive
incentives for performance will become poorer.

Optimal

compensation contracts need to reflect the trade off between
the goals of providing efficient risk-sharing and providing
the CEO with incentives to take appropriate actions.
Though agency models seem to be unable to explain the
observed small pay-performance sensitivity,
remain important agents,
them.

executives

and incentives are important for

Jensen and Murphy suggest an alternative hypothesis

to explain the observed pay-performance relationship for
executives.

Their hypothesis states that political forces

operating in both the public sector and inside organizations
limit large payoffs for exceptional performance.

Truncating

the upper tail of the payoff distribution requires that the
lower tail of the distribution also be truncated to maintain
levels of compensation consistent with equilibrium in the
managerial labor market.

This implicit regulation of

executive compensation is the reason for the declines in the

36

pay- performance relations since the 1930s.

Jensen and

Murphy also find that the relation between compensation and
ownership is independent of insider stock ownership.
In the economics literature,

the inability of agency

theory to explain the high levels of CEO compensation has
given rise to the determination of the value of this
compensation as a tournament
1986).

Here,

(Lazear and Rosen,

1981; Rosen,

executive salary structures are likened to a

series of tournaments or lotteries among contestants.
Winners of the tournament at a lower level in the executive
ladder are allowed to enter the next tournament at the
following higher level.
prize in the lottery;

The compensation of the CEO is the

so those below this level give up some

of their earnings to be put into the prize for which they
will all compete.
effort

Difficulties in monitoring executive

(the principal-agent problem)

and the tendency for

employees to be more risk-averse than firms combine to make
such lottery arrangements preferable under certain
conditions.

This provides the theoretical justification for

the large difference between CEO salary and that of other
executives at the immediately lower level.
comparison theory

(O'Reilly, Main,

originates out of psychology.

The social

& Crystal,

1988)

The theory is based on the

observation that CEO salaries are determined by the
compensation committee of the Board of Directors.

The

members of this committee are often outside directors
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holding CEO positions in other firms.

As such,

it is

possible that a social comparison process operates between
the various CEOs sitting on the Board, with the compensation
of the firm's CEO being determined in part through a
comparison process by the compensation committee members.
Since the CEO exerts informal influence in selecting new
board members,

the selection process itself can raise the

CEO compensation.
There is an increased awareness in the literature that
it is difficult to model entire compensation packages,

and

it might be more fruitful to look at the determinants and
consequences of the type and mix of these packages
(Finkelstein and Hambrick,

1988).

2.5.2 Managerial Ownership of Stock
Lewellen,

Loderer and Rosenfeld

(LLR - 1985)

attempt to

relate the personal wealth circumstances of managers to the
stock returns to bidders.

They state that the possible

incentive effects of mergers arise out of stock ownership,
and mergers cannot be intentionally wealth reducing.
fact,

In

stock ownership is an important means for inducing and

bonding managers to act in the interest of shareholders
(Bentson,

1985).

But if the manager does not own stock,

the

primary incentive for a merger will be to reduce the
variance of managerial compensation possibly leading to
value-reducing acquisitions.

LLR (1985)

conclude from their

analysis that if one observes non-random negative abnormal
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stock price performance by the bidder ex-post,
infer, with a fair degree of certainty,

one can

that the merger

which produced that result is not initiated by a firm whose
managers have large own-company holdings.

In fact,

low

ownership creates its own set of incentives which cannot be
offset by contractual arrangements and competition in the
managerial labor market.

However,

the paper does not

conclusively show that investment decisions differ
systematically between firms with high and low management
ownership of common stock.

There is also no direct evidence

that mergers with negative stock returns represent conflict
of interest.
Morck,

Shleifer and Vishny

(MSV - 1988)

carry out a

detailed study of the relationship between management
ownership and firm valuation arising out of management
performance.
rises,

According to them,

as management ownership

there is a reduction in the agency costs to the firm

due to the deviation of managers from firm value
maximization.

This convergence of interest hypothesis

implies that market value increases with management
ownership.

Conversely, with large ownership, managers can

indulge in non-value maximizing behavior without worrying
about market control features like managerial labor market,
product market,

or hostile takeover market.

the entrenchment hypothesis.
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This is named

Using Tobin's Q to measure market valuation, MSV

(1988)

observe a non-linear relationship between manager ownership
and firm value.
rises.

Between 0% and 5% ownership,

the value of Q

This seems to support the convergence of interests

hypothesis.

However,

the fact that managers of large Q firms

have more stock can also be explained by other reasons.
example,

For

the manager's stock position can come from

remuneration,

and firms that do well are more likely to give

managers stock bonuses or have managers exercise their stock
options.

Also,

if the entrepreneurial ability or a money¬

making idea of top management is rewarded with a higher
equity stake in the firm,

firms with a lot of such

intangible assets will have a higher Q and higher ownership.
Further,

firms with high Q may require a higher ownership

for proper management of assets.

Besides, managers expecting

high future profits might retain higher stakes.

The

retention of higher stakes by the management then conveys a
positive signal to the market and results in a higher stock
price.

In addition,

firms with a young capital stock might

have a higher measured Q than older firms,
have higher management ownership,

and might also

since less time has passed

for initial stakes to get dissipated.
If management ownership falls in the 5% to 25% range,
entrenchment seems to dominate incentives,
Q falls as manager ownership rises.

since the Tobin's

The entrenchment can be

due to the status of the manager as founder,
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enhanced voting

power,

increased tenure with and attachment to the firm,

lower employment of professional managers,
insider directors on the board.

and dominance of

According to MSV,

the

negative effect of higher manager ownership on Q is not an
indicator of inefficiency and may reflect the optimal trade¬
off between profits and private benefits to the management
from non value-maximizing behavior.

Though it seems that

non value-maximizing behavior is more prevalent in
corporations in which management has greater effective
control,

these may also be the firms in which management's

private benefits of control are the greatest.

The higher

level of non-value maximizing behavior in these firms then
simply reflects the fact that management values such
behavior more and therefore the efficient level of such
behavior is higher.

Simultaneously,

there are probably

severe limitations on executive pay and the degree to which
management can be bribed to take particular actions. Without
side payments,

corporate decisions will not necessarily

maximize the sum of cash flows and private benefits to
management because the party with effective control will
make corporate decisions according to his/her personal
preferences.
When manager ownership reaches 25%,
increases with manager ownership,

Tobin's Q again

revealing that the

management is totally entrenched and free of outside
challenge,

so incentives can start working again.
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The main problem with the analysis detailed above is
the use of Tobin's Q to measure market valuation of firms.
However,

as MSV (1988)

mention,

an event study approach

cannot be used because there are hardly any large unexpected
changes in ownership structure uncontaminated by
accompanying news like corporate control contests.
Stulz

(1988)

offers a theory relating management

ownership to Tobin's Q that focusses on the takeover
process.

In his theory, management's preference for control

(and consequent refusal to tender its shares)

forces

acquirers to pay higher premiums to gain control when
management's stake is higher? this sometimes leads to an
increase in the target's ex-ante value.

When management's

stake is so large that no takeover can be profitable,
ex-ante takeover price includes no takeover premium,

the
and is

therefore low.

Stulz's theory differs from Jensen and

Meckling

at the lower end of management ownership

(1976)

since increased shareholder welfare from higher management
ownership results from more effective opposition to
takeovers and not from better alignment of management and
shareholder interests.

Stulz's theory is closely related to

the entrenchment hypothesis of MSV (1988)

at the higher end

as high management ownership effectively precludes a
takeover.
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2.5.3 Managerial Ownership of Stock Options
There have been relatively few studies relating the
incidence of stock options to management behavior.

In a

study of changes in managerial incentives on initial
adoption of stock option plans,

Lambert and Larcker

(1984)

hypothesize that the adoption of stock option plans affect
the executive's risk preferences leading to changes in the
executive's actions that impact on the variability of the
firm's stock price.

Standard option pricing analysis

indicates that the variability of the firm's stock price is
an important factor for determining the value of a stock
option to an executive.
into the managers'

The incorporation of stock options

compensation contracts will encourage

them to increase the variability of the firm's stock price
and make them less averse toward risk.

However,

executives are unable to create a riskless hedge

if the
(because of

their inability to short sell the stock of their own firm)
and they are further unable to transfer the option,

the

value of the option need not increase in variance.

In fact,

the authors find that the adoption of the plan is associated
with a decrease in both unsystematic risk and total variance
of equity returns.
Lambert and Larcker conclude from their study that the
institution of a stock option plan may not be useful if
executives are more risk averse than the extent desired by
stockholders.

The adoption of the stock option plan, while
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helping to synchronize manager-stockholder interests and
lengthening the manager's decision-making time horizon,
actually increase the risk-aversion of the executive.
design of stock option contracts

can
The

(for the purpose of

mitigating a manager's risk aversion)

may thus require an

assessment of the interaction between the degree of
managerial risk-aversion and the rate of return and the
variance of the firm's stock.
Agrawal and Mandelker

(1987)

investigate the effect of

managerial incentives created by holdings of stock and stock
options on the investment and financing decisions of the
firm.

Since managerial decisions are influenced by personal

wealth considerations,

a manager's holdings of common stock

and options will be related to the characteristics of the
investment decisions made by the firm and the resultant
changes in the variability of the firm's assets.

Three

kinds of investment decisions are examined in the study acquisition by mergers,
divestiture by selloffs.

acquisition by tender offers,

and

The study also seeks to find a

relationship between a manager's security holdings and the
firm's financing decisions.
The managers have opposing incentives in the selection
of risky projects.

They like to select investment projects

that reduce the variability of the firm's earnings stream,
due to overinvestment of human capital in one firm and
underdiversification of the personal wealth portfolio.
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This

incentive is strengthened by the fact that the variance of
their employment income is

increased and the certainty

equivalent of the cash flow stream of their income is
reduced if there is an increase in the variance of the
firm's assets.
In contrast,

from option pricing considerations,

the

existence of risky debt causes the value of stock to
appreciate as the variance of the firm goes up.

Further,

an

increase in the variance of the firm enhances the variance
of stock.

Large stock and option holdings can thus

induce

managers to select variance increasing corporate
investments.
financial

On the financing side,

a reduction of

leverage augments the value of the remaining risky

debt because bondholders get better protection on their
claims.

If the financing decision is to have no impact on

the value of firm,

there must be a diminution in the value

of old equity and executive stock options.

This will

further imply a reduction in the variance of stock returns.
Agrawal and Mandelker

(1987)

find that the relative

stock and option holdings of managers of the group of firms
that select investments resulting in variance increases
(increase in risk)

is considerably higher than that for the

variance decreasing group of firms.
security holdings

Hence,

executives'

induce them to make investment decisions

in the interests of their stockholders.

Executive security

holdings are also observed to curtail agency problems
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between managers and stockholders with respect to the firm's
financing decision.

There is a decrease in stockholder's

wealth when leverage is lowered.

Managers with low stock

holdings are thus more likely to reduce leverage.
Having reviewed the relevant literature,

we now turn to

an examination of corporate control contests as they relate
to the issues

in this dissertation.
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ENDNOTES

1.

When, however, the takeover effort failed, generally
all the gains to the target from the merger activity
were lost (Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1983).

2.

Dennis and McConnell (1986) show (for their sample)
that the dollar gains are comparable for bidders and
targets, despite the marked difference in percentage
returns because bidders outsize targets by large
amounts. Thus, in dollar terms, both benefit equally
from the merger. However, these results are slightly at
variance with those of a similar study conducted by
Malatesta (1983).
Malatesta finds an insignificant
dollar loss for the bidding firm.
The two studies are,
however, not strictly comparable as the event dates
were different (merger announcement date for the Dennis
and McConnell study and around the month of board
approval for the Malatesta study).

3.

In these studies, the samples cover only the decades of
the 1970s and the 1980s.

4.

According to a Historical Note in Mergerstat Review
(1982), "hostile raids as an established acquisition
strategy originated in 1974 when Morgan Stanley & Co.
represented International Nickel Co. of Canada in its
hostile and successful offer for ESB, Inc. The fact
that Morgan Stanley, a reputable investment banking
firm, was engaged in such action rendered the hostile
takeover an acceptable practice.
The prevalence of
takeover battles resulted in a specialized industry
consisting of investment bankers, attorneys, proxy
solicitors, and public relations professionals, all of
whom were offering expertise on offensive and defensive
tactics." - p. 43.

5.

Schipper and Thomson (1983) show that bidding firms
generate positive abnormal returns during the
announcement of an acquisition policy.
Studies on
bidder returns generally measure the impact of
implementation of the policy.

6.

Tobin's Q is defined to be equal to the ratio of the
firm's market value to the replacement cost of its
physical assets.
Tobin's Q is high when the firm has
valuable intangible assets in addition to physical
assets, e.g. monopoly power, goodwill, a stock of
patents, or good managers. Measurement difficulties
make the Tobin's Q an imprecise estimator of firm
performance.
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7.

Seyhun (1990) seeks to provide empirical evidence for
this point of view through a study of stock
transactions of top managers of bidding firms for their
personal accounts as signals of their motivations.

8.

The rationale of Shleifer and Vishny (1988, 1989) is
consistent with earlier explanations of managerial
behavior in the context of conglomerate mergers, where
managers were posited to be diversifying their
employment risk through
acquisitions (Amihud and Lev,
1981; Amihud, Dodd and Weinstein, 1986). However,
Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld (1989) do not find any
empirical evidence of reduction in firm risk as a
result of mergers.

9.

BDK (1988) have two partitions, in 1968 and 1980, over
the range of their sample period from 1963 to 1984.
Since hostile bids originated in 1974 (see footnote 4
above), the incidence of multiple bids can only be
significant for that segment of the time interval
1969-1980 which occurred after 1974.
As such, a more
revealing comparison of single bid acquirers with
multiple bid acquirers could perhaps have been made
with an additional partition of the sample in 1974.

10.

BDK (1988) further state that "our data indicate that
the average white knight pays 'too much' for the target
it acquires" - p.25.
No reason or explanation is
offered for such overpayment.
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CHAPTER 3
CONTROL CONTESTS INVOLVING WHITE KNIGHTS

3.1 Description of WK Contests
One of the successful ways by which a target can fend
off an unwelcome bidder in a corporate control contest is to
invite a friendly third party

(the WK)

for the target and acquire it.

to subsequently bid

This may not be a preferred

outcome for the managers of the target, who may much rather
have their firm retain its independent existence for the
foreseeable future.
a HB,

Yet,

on being confronted with a bid by

they may be left with no alternative than to choose to

be acquired by the friendly WK.1
contest,

In a corporate control

the WK bid has several features and motivations not

readily found in other corporate control situations.

These

are:
(i)

From the WK's point of view,

it is a takeover bid

which makes the battle for corporate control at least
a three-party contest consisting of a target,
bidder,

and a friendly bidder.

a hostile

The same target

simultaneously entertains both a hostile bid and a
friendly bid in an auction market for the target.
(ii)

From the target's point of view,

it is an antitakeover

defense against the HB following a takeover bid,
thereby yielding a strong positive target shareholder
wealth reaction unavailable in other anti-takeover
defenses.

(iii) The original HB or other potential bidders always have
the option of offering a higher bid than the WK,
thereby enlarging the auction process.

The antitakeover

defense of the target firms' managers may be said to
have failed,

and their own future may be in jeopardy,

if the WK does not finally prevail.
process,

Yet,

through the

target shareholders may gain significantly as

bids pile up on top of one another.
(iv)

The WK bid may be looked upon as an acquisition-based
preventive antitakeover measure of the WK, masquerading
as a subsequent friendly bid.

By acquiring the target,

the WK makes itself larger and more difficult to
acquire.2

In the process,

it may also remove some of

its own attractiveness as a takeover target e.g.
cash.

However,

excess

the unplanned nature of the WK bid

may makes this antitakeover outcome more a consequence
of the process than a motivation for the WK to
undertake such activity.
We feel that the various distinguishing features of
WKs,

as outlined above, make takeover battles involving WKs

a singularly appropriate framework for a detailed study of
-

the bidding process in corporate acquisitions,
managerial motivations in the firms involved in
these processes,

and

investor reactions to activities in the multiparty
corporate control market.3
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In a two-bidder context where the motives of the
bidders may not be identical,

an acquisition effort for a

target firm has a lot of similarities with auction activity
(Roll,

1986).

In fact,

Fishman

(1988)

analyzes competitive

bidding in takeovers by initially assuming it to be
equivalent to an English Auction,4 with the bidders
initiating the bidding process rather than the target
offering itself for sale.5

The base price of the target

firm is likely to correspond to the current market value of
its stockholders' wealth when the bidding begins.
Presumably,

the first bidder makes its bid after a careful

scrutiny of the target firm.

The amount it ultimately pays

for the target will be capped by the lower of:
(a)

the potential of the target to generate wealth
(through future activity,

divestiture,

outright restructuring/sale of assets)

spinoffs,

or

in excess of

the amount paid by the bidder to the target firm,
(b)

or

The resources which the bidder is able to assemble for
the purpose of the takeover.

In practice,

the bidding typically begins at a lower level

and may not reach values where resource constraints come
into play.
The WK enters the auction after the control contest has
begun.

Since the primary intent of the WK bid seems to be

to support the "friendly" management of the target firm,
is unlikely that the WK firm has made a prior
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(planned)

it

evaluation of the value of the target to it as an
acquisition.6

Once the control contest has begun,

there

may be inadequate time for an appropriate independent
scrutiny.

We may thus reasonably conjecture that the WK has

undertaken little detailed examination of the target firm,7
or else the WK itself may have been the likely acquirer in a
friendly takeover.8
3.2 Bidding Variations in WK Contests
A detailed investigation of the sequence of bidding in
the control contests with WK participation reveals three
distinct market processes as follows:
(i)

The common occurrence is for the HB bid
rejected by the target,

(H)

to be

and a follow up bid by a WK (W)

leading to the withdrawal of the HB.

This situation

corresponds to the construct described by Giammarino
and Heinkel

(1986)

and is the standard bidding

situation.
(ii)

In some instances,

the first bid

followed up by a second
by the HB.

(H),

on rejection,

(or even third)

higher bid

This is followed by the WK bid

withdrawal of the HB.

(W)

is
(H)

and the

This process is described under

the bidding acronym HHW.

The bidding pattern here does

not precisely conform to the English auction structure,
as the second higher bid is made by the HB.

Yet,

an

auction does take place since the subsequent bid/(s)
the HB is/are followed by the WK bid.9
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of

(iii)In some cases,

the bidding is sequential

(HW)

as in

English Auctions, but the WK bid is followed by one or
more sequences of HW
contest.

Thus,

(e.g. HWHW)

before the end of the

in these situations,

least once after a WK bid,
twice after HB bids.

the HB bids at

and the WK bids at least

This process is described as

alternating sequential bidding

(ASB).

This review of market processes indicates that based on
the respective presence of HHW and ASB attributes,

there are

two relevant partitions of these contests on the basis of
sequencing of bids:
Instances where the WK bid is the third bid
sequence after two consecutive bids

(HH)

(W)

in the

by the same

HB - the HHW WKs - are distinguished from other cases
of sequential bids

(H always followed by W)

by

different parties from the first bid onwards - the
non-HHW WKs.10
Instances of alternating sequential bidding, where each
of the pair of bidders has bid more than once on an
alternating basis - the ASB WKs - are separated from
the contrasting situation of only one sequence of HW in
the control contest - the non-ASB WKs.
3.3 Hypotheses - Bidding Behavior
In formulating the hypotheses below, we assume that the
target's valuation is not identical to the HB and the WK.
Since the WK bid has to improve upon the preceding HB
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bid(s) ,

it may end up overpaying the target firm to the

detriment of its own stockholders.11

In such situations,

the WK stockholders and the pool of investors may not be
favorably disposed to the actions of the managers of the WK
in following a possible non-value maximizing strategy.
Since these stockholders and the investors are likely to
perceive the WK activity as a negative net present value
project,

their displeasure will

significant fall

likely be reflected in a

in the WK stockholders'

hypothesize that on average,

wealth.

We thus

the WK stock price will

react

negatively to the WK bid.
3.3.1 Hypotheses Regarding HHW WKs
We hypothesize that the initial absence of sequential
bidding in HHW cases will

impact on the first WK bid.

The

fact that the HB submits a second bid immediately following
its first bid can reasonably be interpreted to imply that
(i)

The first bid is low,

below the maximum the HB is

willing and able to offer.
(ii)

The second bid is likely to capture all or most of the
anticipated gains

for the HB.

This generates two competing hypotheses:

Overpayment Hypothesis: Since synergistic gains for the HHW
WKs are likely to have been fully captured by the HB
(through the second bid),

there is a greater probability of

the WK bid being an overpayment;

the HHW WKs will thus have

a larger negative abnormal return for the first WK bid.
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This situation will be more likely for identical valuation
of the target by the HB and the WK,

and can lend strong

support to the view that managers of all WK firms are indeed
going in for growth maximization

(Shleifer and Vishny,

1988)

at the cost of firm value maximization.
•'Correlated Values"12 Hypothesis:

For the HHW process,

the

WK seems to enter the auction process later - after two
preceding bids.

The HB's second bid is likely to alert the

WK that synergistic gains to the HB have pretty much been
captured in the existing bids. As such,

the WK is not likely

to enter the fray and overbid the HB - unless it is aware of

specific synergies for itself in the acquisition, not
available to the HB.

Further,

the fact that the WK bid

comes sequentially after two HB bids signifies that the WK
managers are more likely to have professionally evaluated
the takeover.

Thus,

the WK is now in a much better position

to avoid the "winner's curse."
(1987)

point out,

As McAfee and McMillan

the assumption relating to independent

private values13 is violated for correlated values of the
object of the auction?
auctions14

in this situation,

English

(as the bidding process in these control

contests constitute)
"winner's curse."15

result in a minimization of the
For all the above reasons,

the

negative abnormal return for the HHW WKs is likely to be
less than that for the non-HHW WKs.
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3.3.2 The Time Interval Dimension
As stated in section 3.2 above,

the WK bid is likely to

be made in relative haste in the available time window after
the HB bid.

Necessarily,

an important dimension in this

process is time, which can be considered to be a proxy for
the extent of appraisal made by the WK prior to its bid.
such,

As

we posit that the time gap T between the first WK bid

and the prior HB bid will influence the abnormal return
(CAR)

to the WK in a positive manner.

span,

the larger will be the negative excess return.

thus postulate

The shorter this time

(for later empirical examination)

We

an equation

of the form
CAR = a + B^D + 132*T + e

(1)

D is a dummy representing WKs under the HHW market
process.

The negative reaction to the WK bid will lead to a

negative sign for the estimator a of the intercept.

The

"correlated values" hypothesis stated in section 3.3.1 will
imply a positive sign for b1,

the estimator of the

coefficient of the dummy variable representing WKs under the
HHW process.

The overpayment hypothesis will imply the

opposite sign for b1.

In other words,

the existence of the

HHW feature will result in a lateral reduction in the
negative CAR for WKs.

The sign of the estimator b2 for the

coefficient of the time interval variable will be positive,
to corroborate the position that the lack of extensive
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examination of the target
proxy)

(for which the time interval is a

causes the negative CARs for WKs.

3.3.3 Hypotheses regarding ASB WKs
In respect of the ASB WKs,

there are two competing

hypotheses:
Repetition Hypothesis:

In the ASB market process,

sequential auction-like bidding recurs.

Each subsequent bid

of the WK can be looked upon as a repetition of the sequence
begun by them with their first bid.
first WK bid is negative,

If the reaction to the

there will be significant negative

abnormal returns for the subsequent WK bids as well.

While

the HB's second bid will indicate to the market that their
bidding margin is not yet exhausted,

this bid will appear in

the second sequence and hence not be known to the WK
stockholders when they react to the first WK bid.

They will

thus react to the subsequent bids of the WK managers in the
same way in which they reacted to the first
expecting a subsequent HB bid),

(i.e.

not

perhaps more severely so,

assuming at each stage that the WK managers have overbid.
Also,

if this hypothesis is true,

the outcome of the contest

will be more likely to be successful acquisition by the WK.
Recovery Hypothesis:

Alternatively,

one can hypothesize

that the losses suffered in the first WK bid will be
recovered in the subsequent WK bids;

for the existence of

subsequent HB bids indicates that the first WK bid is more
likely to have been a firm value maximization strategy.
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This situation is more likely for identical valuation of the
target by the HB and the WK.

The higher HB bid can then be

taken as a signal of target value,

and market reaction to

the subsequent WK bids will neutralize the negative reaction
to the first WK bid.
3.4

Hypotheses - Managerial Motivation
The hypotheses laid out in this section require a

consideration of the conflicting hypotheses regarding the
bidding behavior of WKs and their various partitions based
on bidding sequence.
preview the results
hypotheses.

This consideration requires that we
from testing the bidding sequence

We accordingly posit the managerial motivation

hypotheses based on the results of testing the hypotheses
regarding bidding behavior elucidated in the preceding
section,

and drawing appropriate inferences

(as discussed in chapter 5).
Values" hypothesis
market process,

Specifically,

from the same
the

is seen to be valid for WKs under the HHW

and the Repetition hypothesis is seen to be

valid for the WKs under the ASB market process.
hypotheses

"Correlated

The

in this section are further motivated by the

following premises:
The presence of stock and stock options
packages provides

in compensation

incentives to managers to maximize

the value of the stock of the firm and hence align
their interests with those of the stockholders.

Agency

conflicts between stockholders and managers are thereby
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minimized.

Managers will thus be more inclined to

undertake actions which maximize the value of the firm
if they have a larger proportion of their compensation
in the form of stock and stock options relative to
other cash and cash-equivalent forms of compensation.
Conversely,

a relatively larger proportion of cash and

cash-equivalent forms of remuneration in managerial
compensation packages is likely to provide incentives
to managers for maximizing the size of the firm:

the

strong positive empirical relationship between firm
size and cash and cash-equivalent forms of compensation
is well documented.
stock options

The lower proportion of stock and

in this kind of remuneration package

will likely not encourage managers to conform to the
stockholder goal of firm value maximization.
other hand,

On the

the resultant incentive may well act to the

detriment of the stockholders as managers are
encouraged to undertake value-reducing acquisitions
with the sole objective of increasing size and thereby
increasing their cash compensation.
The presence of relatively higher levels of debt in the
capital

structure of firms is likely to imply the

existence of better monitoring mechanisms
scrutiny of the managers'

actions.

for a closer

The additional

supervision arising out of the existence of debt can
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thus be

the

a disincentive to the managers

which do not maximize

firm value.

In the

it becomes necessary to

above context,

relative

influence

competing kinds
the

interests

(in the

form of

issues

of managerial

of

remuneration -

of the managers with those

and the

evaluate

on observed WK behavior of the two

form of managerial

options)
the

for actions

one

of the

aligning
stockholders

ownership and holdings

other motivating an

increase

cash and cash-equivalent

concern need to be

in

of

stock

size

(in

compensation).

addressed here.

Three

They are

as

follows:The variables used
as

ratios

of both

in the analysis

in order to

stock

(and

need to be defined

incorporate the

stock option)

incentive effects

ownership

and cash

remuneration.
To the

extent

feasible,

the variables used

analysis need to be normalized
To provide

in the

for size.

economic content to the

ratios

defined,

both the numerator and the denominator need to be
expressed
Since
variables

stock and

of

stock option ownership are

representing wealth,

compensation
"stock"

in comparable units.

is

a

"flow"

"stock"

and cash and cash equivalent

variable representing

income,

common equity and

options

are converted to

variables by multiplying the

"stock"

variable by the

return of the

relevant common

stock.
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As managerial

the
"flow"

rate

of

motivation is more likely governed by ex-ante expectations
of income

flows

from managerial holdings,

we consider it

appropriate to use the expected rate of return
to a historical rate of return)

on the relevant common stock

when converting the "stock" variable to the
Also,

(as opposed

"flow" variable.

by defining variables with cash compensation in the

denominator,

the impact

(if any)

of size on the variables

considerably reduced due to the strong empirical
relationship between cash compensation and size.
The

following variables of interest are accordingly

defined:

INCENTIVE VARIABLES

1.

2.

Annual expected income from stock holding
COM = Annual cash and cash-equivalent remuneration
Annual expected income from stock options held
OP = Annual cash-and cash-equivalent remuneration

MONITORING VARIABLE

3.

Book value of outstanding debt
DEQ = Market value of common equity

We note

in this regard that managerial motivation

resulting from alignment of managers'
of the stockholders

interests with those

is traditionally measured in the
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is

literature

(see chapter 2)

through a variable MGR,

defined

as
Total shares of common stock held by managers
MGR -Total number of common shares of the firm

Although size

(for which the market value of total common

stock is treated as a proxy)

and cash compensation have been

empirically found to be correlated,

we maintain that the

direct incentive consequences of cash compensation cannot be
fully evaluated by using size as a proxy for the same.
While the hypotheses below are formulated and the study is
carried out using our constructed variables COM,

OP and DEQ,

we have simultaneously reported the results using MGR
wherever appropriate.
We posit that

Hypothesis

1:

Ceteris paribus,

managers of WK firms will have a

lower COM as compared to managers of HB firms.

Control HB firms are more likely to have managers acting in
the best interests of their stockholders.

This

is evidenced

by the absence of significant market reaction to the HB
bids,

as detailed in chapter 5.

The compensation packages

of the managers of HBs will presumably incorporate a greater
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proportion of stock holdings
options)

(excluding unexercised stock

relative to the compensation packages of the

managers of WKs,

to provide more incentive to meet the

stockholder goal of firm value maximization.
HB and the WK operate in control contests
frame,

Since both the

in the same time

any tax-incentive effects of compensation in the form

of stock or stock options will be common to both groups and
hence controlled for.

Hypothesis 2:

Ceteris paribus,

managers of WK firms will have a

lower OP than the managers of HB firms.

Stock options,

a

form of deferred compensation to deal with

the time horizon problem of the manager,
stake in the firm's

future cash flows,

give him/her a

which are,

after all,

discounted at appropriate rates to yield shareholder value.
This encourages the manager toward variance increasing
investment projects which increase the value of the option.
Yet,

the options also increase the riskiness of his/her

personal wealth which cannot be diversified away like that
of investors.

This may make him/her more reluctant to

choose variance increasing projects.

Available evidence

seems to indicate that the incentive effects overwhelm those
of increased risk exposure

(LLM,
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1987;

Agrawal

& Mandelker,

1987).16

Incentive effects

for firm value maximization

are likely to be lower for WK firms,

implying a lower

proportion of unexercised valid stock options

in the

compensation packages of their managers.

Hypothesis 3:

Ceteris paribus,

WK firms will have a lower DEQ

than HB firms.

The presence of higher levels of debt can ensure better
monitoring of managerial activity through bond covenants
(Smith and Warner,
of

"free"

1979).

This tends to restrict the amount

cash flow available to managers

hence makes them act in a

(Jensen,

1986)

and

firm value maximizing way.

According to this approach,

managers will prefer relatively

lower levels of debt to avoid monitoring if they are
desirous of acting in a non firm value maximizing manner.
the other hand,

On

the same managers may have an inclination

for higher levels of debt based upon their holding of stock
options.

The larger the risky debt of the firm,

the greater

is the value of the stock options held by the manager,
because a reduction of debt causes a reduction in the
variance of stock returns as existing debt becomes more
valuable at the cost of equity and stock options.
of WKs will

Managers

likely have a greater propensity for "free"
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cash

flow and correspondingly,
DEQ.

However,

the WK firms will have a lower

this will be predicated on the managers of WK

firms having low holdings of stock options relative to HB
firms

(hypothesis 2)

and relative to other forms of

compensation in the form of stock or cash

(as observed

empirically) .17

Hypothesis 4:

Ceteris paribus,

managers of non-HHW WK firms will

have a lower COM as compared to managers of HHW WK
firms.

This hypothesis originates

from the extent and significance

of wealth reduction on first or subseguent bidding by the
WK,

as discussed in chapter 5.

cumulative abnormal return
negative,

(CAR)

For the HHW WKs,

the

is considerably less

and is not significant across all time intervals.

In the two day interval ending with the date of the first WK
bid,

the average CAR is -1.0% and -4.1%

HHW WKs respectively.

Besides,

for HHW WKs and non-

56% of the CARs are negative

for HHW WKs and 85% of the CARs are negative for non-HHW
WKs.

These results do indicate that the market does not

react as adversely to bids by HHW WKs as it does to bids by
non-HHW WKs.

This hypothesis seeks to link this external

manifestation of WK bids to the incentive alignments
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in the

compensation structure of their managers
holdings of common stock of the firm.
hypothesis will

in the form of

Support for this

indicate that managers of HHW WKs may indeed

be desirous of acting in a firm value maximizing manner as
per their remuneration scheme,

yet be afflicted by hubris or

the winner's curse resulting in unintentional overpayment.
In this sense,

the incentive alignments of managers of HHW

WKs may not be significantly different from those of
managers of HBs.

Hypothesis 5:

Ceteris paribus,

managers of non-HHW WK firms will

have a lower OP as compared to managers of HHW WK
firms.

This hypothesis originates
preceding one.

Empirical

from the same premises as the

support will

indicate the

disinclination on the part of managers of non-HHW WKs to
engage in firm value maximizing activity.

Hypothesis 6:

Ceteris paribus,

non-HHW WK firms will have a

lower DEQ than HHW WK firms.
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The premises

for the hypothesis are similar to the arguments

used to support hypothesis 3.

Empirical evidence in its

favor will be an indication of monitoring effectiveness and
the validity of the "free"

cash flow hypothesis.

Hypothesis 7:

Ceteris paribus,
COM,

there will be no difference

in

OP or DEQ between managers of ASB WK firms

and managers of non-ASB WK firms.

In constructing hypotheses relating to managerial
motivation,

there is a critical difference between the HHW

and ASB market processes

for WKs.

The distinguishing

features of the HHW WK manifest themselves prior to the
first WK bid.

However,

prior to the first WK bid,

there is

no difference between the standard HW sequence and the ASB
market process.

Accordingly,

incentive-related variables may

not affect ASB WKs differentially if the Repetition
Hypothesis of bidding behavior is
such instances,

found to be valid.

In

the ASB process is perceived to be a

repetition of the standard HW process with similar market
reaction in each HW sequence.

Hypothesis 7

is generated

from the empirical validity of the Repetition hypothesis as
an explanation for the bidding behavior of ASBs
Chapter 5).
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(shown in

The various hypotheses presented above
empirical testing)

(supported by

will indeed show the absence of

homogeneity among WKs,

and validate the basic partitioning

of the sample according to the sequence of bidding.

The

return consequences for HHW WKs seem to be not much
different from the HBs, with negative CARs during their bids
being likely due to hubris or the "winner's curse".
contrast,

In

non-firm value maximizing factors like size

maximization or "free" cash flow consumption are more likely
to govern the CARs for the non-HHW WKs.

The ASB WKs

manifest themselves as the extreme fringe of this latter
group of non-HHW WKs in their bidding behavior.

However,

this feature will not be distinguishable from the incentive
related behavior of their managers, which reveal themselves
during their first bid.
In developing the aforesaid hypotheses,

the behavior of

managers of the various categories of bidding firms defined
above are postulated to be motivated by the structure of
their compensation packages and monitoring intensity implied
by higher levels of leverage.

Structural differences in

these variables thus distinguish firms characterized by
firm-value maximizing managers from others characterized by
managers whose incentives may not propel them toward an
objective of firm value maximization.

Since the abnormal

returns in the context of the market model measure the
investor reaction to firm specific events,
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such returns are

an indicator of whether the market views the bidding event
as firm value maximizing.

The variables representing

compensation and capital structures thus not only lead to
significant positive variation in the abnormal returns in a
cross-sectional context,

but the resulting regression is

also able to identify structural differences across the
various groups of bidders.

We thus specify the following

model:

CAR = a + B^COM + B2*OP + B3*DEQ + e

(2)

where

CAR = Two day cumulative abnormal return for the
bidding firm ending on date of the bid.
COM = Proportion of firm stock held by managers as a
share of cash and cash-equivalent compensation.
OPT = Proportion of unexercised valid stock options
held by managers as a share of cash and cashequivalent compensation.
DEQ = Debt-equity ratio

Support of the various hypotheses stated above will
imply that the estimators of the coefficients of the
independent variables will all be significant and have
positive signs.
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ENDNOTES

1.

For a general management perspective on WKs, see
Kesner and Dalton (1985) and Jennings and Mazzeo
(1986).
Though the relative articles have not been
used for sample selection, the cases cited in the
articles independently form part of our sample.

2.

Lofthouse (1984) points out that an acguisition will
make a firm more expensive to acguire.
However, we do
recognize the ambiguity of increasing size as an
effective antitakeover strategy.

3.

It is interesting to note, in this regard, that while
there is substantial literature ascribing target
managers' behavior in corporate control contests to
"management entrenchment", especially in regard to
antitakeover defenses, there is hardly any reference to
such "entrenchment" for the bidder managers for any of
their actions in these contests.
If one accepts the
hypothesis that target managers may not act in the best
interest of their shareholders in control contests, the
same possibility cannot be ruled out for the bidding
firm's managers.
This point was made by Shleifer and
Vishny (1988).

4.

McAfee and McMillan (1987) define an auction as "a
market institution with an explicit set of rules
determining resource allocation and prices on the basis
of bids from the market participants."
The
distinguishing features of the English Auction are:
the price is successively raised until only one
bidder remains.
At any point in time, each bidder knows the level
of the current best bid.

5.

Also, the object of the auction changes continually in
contrast to the English auction where the object does
not change for the duration of the auction (Khanna,
1986).

6.

We acknowledge the feasibility of a WK bid arising out
of other reasons viz.
-

The bid could be part of a capital acguisition
strategy by the bidder, with the WK nature of the
bid being coincidental.
The WK firm could also be
following a policy of not making hostile bids, as
part of its overall strategy.
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The bid could be in the nature of a large
investment not for acquiring control, but for
defeating the first hostile bid.
We deal with these motivations while discussing the
results.
7.

A detailed appraisal by the WK would have likely
included an estimate of the maximum amount the WK
should pay for the target after taking into
consideration all the potential synergistic factors.
The relative haste with which the subsequent bid is
made by the WK also prevents an assessment of whether
the HB has already reached the maximum value of its
bidding range.

8.

Lofthouse (1984) makes the point that if there is merit
to acquisition by the WK, there seems to be no rational
reason for it to risk a contested bid instead of going
in for a preemptive bid.

9.

If the process ended with a higher bid by the HB after
the rejection of its first bid, it would be an economic
bargaining process with no auction features. The
auction is triggered by the WK bid.

10.

In the HHW market process, the auction does not
commence with the second bid, which is made by the same
bidder who made the first bid.
The first WK bid, which
is the third bid in the sequence, triggers the auction.

11.

As detailed in Chapter 2, the reasons for possible
overpayment by the managers of bidding firms can be
ascribed to hubris (Roll, 1986), to "winner's curse"
(Varaiya and Ferris, 1987), to free cash flow (Jensen,
1986), and to growth maximization (Shleifer and Vishny,
1988) .

12.

A detailed description of correlated values in auctions
is available in McAfee and McMillan (1987), p 720.

13.

The assumption of independent private values postulates
that any one bidder's valuation is statistically
independent from any other bidder's valuation.
Thus,
each bidder knows precisely the value of the auctioned
object to itself, but does not know the value of the
object to the other bidders.
Giliberto and Varaiya
(1989) apply this concept to bank auctions.
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14 .

It should be noted that the market process examined
here deviates from the traditional English Auction in
as much as the value of the auctioned object is no
longer time invariant.

15.

We assume that the first bids of the HB and the WK
arise from their independent distributions of the
valuation of the target. The second bid of the HB, if
arising prior to the WK bid, uses up most of the
synergy anticipated by the HB, and provides imperfect
information to the WK about the value of the target.
This information warns the WK that the cost of a
successful bid will be high, and helps in reducing the
"winner's curse".

16.

An exception is the study by Lambert & Larcker (1984)
which shows that the introduction of a stock option
plan leads to a decrease in variance for the firm.

17.

Smiley and Stewart (1985) mention that WK firms have
high leverage.
We feel that such a situation will
arise only if the holding of stock options of WK
managers is high enough in absolute and relative terms
to predominate their urge for "free" cash flow, which
can enable them to enhance their cash compensation by
increasing size.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

4.1

Data Identification

4.1.1 Sample of Contesting Firms
Our definition of a WK requires the firm to fulfil both
of the
1.

following criteria:

It must make a subsequent bid to acquire the target,

or

to acquire a substantial non-majority interest in the
target,

after

(a)

one or more hostile bids;

initiation of a proxy contest;
equity position with hostile
2.

There must be evidence of

or

(c)

(b)

acquisition of an

intent.

"collaboration" between the

WK and the target prior to the WK bid,
reports

or

in published

(by explicit reference in the responsible

financial press to the bidder as WK),

or other

indications signifying collaboration.
Jensen and Ruback

(1983)

may take one of three forms:
contest.1

note that takeover activity
tender offer,

The term WK is loosely used,

their participation in such activity,
number of different situations.

merger,

or proxy

in the context of

to incorporate a

For example,

a target firm

may always arrange to be preemptively taken another firm
(termed as a WK by Mergerstat Review)
when the target

in a friendly merger

firm is anticipating a hostile bid but none

has materialized.

In such situations,

there is no bidding

contest and the valuation consequences are likely to be

similar to a friendly merger between the two firms.
addition,

In

there can be a non-collaborative subsequent bidder

in multiple bidding situations for the target where the bids
from this bidder cannot be identified as

friendly.2

definition of the WK excludes these occurrences,
incorporates only those

Our

and

firms which enter the bidding

process with a friendly bid after the target's anti-hostile
takeover defense is triggered

(so far as

its market

informational characteristics are concerned)

with the

commencement of a takeover bid or proxy fight independent of
the WK bid.

In our study,

WKs can exist only in the context

of hostile takeover bids by non-WK firms or proxy contests
launched by hostile dissidents or raiders or large open
market purchases with hostile intent.3

Also,

with only

public firms being amenable to event analyses,

subsequent

friendly bidders which are private parties are excluded from
the study.
The corresponding HBs
in some ways,

in the three party contests act,

like a control group with which WK reaction

can be compared.

For the proxy contests,

the date of

announcement of the proxy fight is treated as the date of
the

"bid",

as this

is the event date where most of the

activity is observed as
(Dodd and Warner,

1983).

far as shareholders are concerned
For large open market purchases,

the date when the equity position is acquired with
expression of hostile intent,

as reported in the Wall Street
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Journal,

is treated as the date of the "bid".

The study on

bidding behavior is conducted using a sample of WK firms
quoted in New York Stock Exchange
Exchange

(AMEX)

(NYSE)

and American Stock

which fulfil the criteria listed in the

previous paragraph during the 10-year period 1978-1987.
sample

is primarily obtained from Mergerstat Review

published by W.T.

Grimm & Co.,

supplemented by a search from

the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service
4.1.2

The

(DJNS).4

Compensation and Financial Data
For conducting the second part of the study relating to

manager motivation,

the following data are obtained by

scrutinizing the relevant annual proxy statement immediately
preceding the control contest,

filed by each firm with the

Securities and Exchange Commission
-

(SEC):

the extent of direct and beneficial ownership of common
stock by the principal executive officers
a date

(managers)

on

immediately preceding the contest,

the annual managerial compensation for the WK and HB
firms

for the financial year immediately preceding the

contest,

and

the extent of outstanding

(unexercised and unexpired)

executive stock options held by managers
weighted average exercise price)

(and their

on a date immediately

preceding the contest.
The

information relating to direct and beneficial

ownership of common stock by the principal executive
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officers

is available for all the firms,

and sometimes

indicates the inclusion of stock options exercisable within
60 days.

The number of such officers

is disclosed along

with the aggregate direct and beneficial ownership;
criteria

yet no

for the selection of officers eligible to appear in

the aggregation are ever listed in the proxy statements.
In the earlier years of the sample time-period,

the

annual compensation for a predetermined and stated number of
principal executive officers

is listed under the following

headings:
A.

Cash and cash-equivalent remuneration
(i)

Salaries,
Bonuses,

(ii)

Director's Fees,
and

Securities or property,
reimbursement,

B.

Commissions and

insurance benefits or

personal benefits.

Aggregate of contingent forms of remuneration
(including stock options,

In subsequent time periods,
above,

not separately indicated).

most firms report only part A

separately or in the aggregate,

compensation during the time period.

as executive
For these firms,

the

aggregate contingent compensation is not directly listed in
the proxy statements either as part of total executive
compensation or elsewhere in the proxy statement.
purposes of equivalence across time periods,

For

and also

because our hypotheses

focus on cash and cash equivalent

forms of compensation,

we exclude aggregate deferred

76

compensation in our study even when they are available
some of the firms

in the sample.5

Once again,

for

the data is

available

for an aggregate number of principal executive

officers,

without any listing of the criteria

The proxy statements

for the

firms

for selection.

in the sample always

provide data regarding the executive stock options granted
during the year and its weighted average exercise price.
However,

the variable of interest in the study is the value

of the outstanding

(unexercised and unexpired)

stock options

held by principal executive officers at any point of time,
and their weighted average exercise price.
description of executive stock options

The mode of

in the proxy

statements also changes radically over time,

and more so

than the description of executive remuneration.
Most existing studies which need to assign a dollar
value to executive stock options use them for computing
total compensation of managers.

Since such compensation is

correctly interpreted as the annual

income of the managers,

stock options are treated as deferred income.
the data of interest to researchers

In doing so,

is the amount of stock

options granted during the year for which the compensation
is being measured,
In our study,

and its weighted average exercise price.

however

(also Agrawal and Mandelker;

1987),

the variable of interest is the amount of unexercised stock
options outstanding

(including,

and usually greater than the

stock options granted during the year for which compensation
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is being measured)

and its weighted average exercise price,

because managerial actions will be more likely to be
motivated by this variable,

rather than a variable

representing merely the stock options granted during the
year.

We thus need the closing inventory of stock options

and weighted average exercise price of these options.6
The data on executive stock options
statements has wide variations,

and there appears to be a

time dimension to such reporting.
reporting,

in the proxy

The different types of

and the approximations being used by us

for

obtaining the closing inventory of options and their
weighted average exercise price from each of these reporting
variations are detailed in section 4.3.1 below.
For converting managerial holdings of common stock and
stock options to an ex-ante potential
expected rate of return E(R)

income flow,

the

on common stock is calculated

using the Capital Asset Pricing Model.

Beta for each firm

is obtained from the market model estimates as explained in
section 4.2 below.
to be 8.6%,7

The average market premium is considered

and the risk-free rate is proxied by the

average annual rate on 3 month Treasury Bills
preceding the contest,

in the year

as reported in the Annual Statistical

Digest of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.
The financial data of relevance for the sample firms
obtained from two sources.

The aggregate outstanding debt

is obtained from the relevant Moody's Manuals
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(Industrial,

is

Transportation,
case may be).

Utilities,

or Banking and Finance as the

The aggregate value of common stock is

extracted from the master tapes of the Center for Research
in Security Prices

(CRSP).

4.2 Methodology - Bidding Behavior
The event time methodology is employed to examine the
valuation consequences

for each of the participants

multi-party contests involving WKs.

in

The specific attributes

of the methodology employed are those outlined by Hite and
Owers

(1983).

The methodology accommodates the need to

examine both fixed and variable length time intervals.
For each security j,

the market model

calculate an abnormal return

(AR)

is used to

for event day t as

follows:

ARit =

where R-t
t,

and Rf)t

[Rjt -

(aj + bjKnt)]

is the rate of return on security j

for event day

is the rate of return on the Center for Research

in Security Prices
t.

(3)

(CRSP)

The coefficients

value-weighted index on event day

and b.}

are the ordinary least

squares estimates of the intercept and slope,
of the market model regression,

which is run over an

estimation period from t=-200 to t=-51,
initial event date t=0.

respectively,

relative to the

The initial event date

(t=0)

is the

first date on which the relevant event is mentioned in the
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Wall Street Journal - event dates are obtained from the Wall
Street Journal

Index.

Abnormal returns are calculated for

each security over the interval

-50,...., L-,

where L.

is the

number of trading days between the initial event date and
the final event date for the firm j.
abnormal return

(CAR)

The cumulative

from event day T^. to event day T2j.

is

defined as

CARj-

(4)
t=T

ij

We cumulate over various

intervals,

common length across securities

(e.g.,

some of which vary across securities
For a sample of N securities,

_
CAR =

some of which are of
t = -50,.,0)

(e.g.,

and

t = -50,...,L-).

the mean CAR is defined as

N
2
CAR.
j=i

(5)

The expected value of CAR is

zero in the absence of abnormal

performance.
The test statistic described by Dodd and Warner
is the mean standardized cumulative abnormal return.
compute this statistic,

the abnormal return ARjt

is

standardized by its estimated standard deviation Sjt,8
i.e. ,
SARj, =

(ARjt/sjt)

(6)
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(1983)
To

The standardized cumulative abnormal return SCAR;
interval t = T1 j..,T2j

SCAR,. =

S

over the

is

SARjt/ J (T2j

- Ttj +

1)

(7)

t=TU
The test statistic for a sample of N securities

N
Z

Z =

_
SCAR./7N

is

(8)

j=i

Each SARjt

is assumed to be distributed unit normal

absence of abnormal performance.

in the

Under this assumption,

Z

is also unit normal.
It can be conjectured that few firms adopt strategies
to be a WK,

as there are apparently no benefits to be

derived by the shareholders
action.

This,

from such a course of proposed

coupled with the unanticipated,

nature of the bid,9 makes

subsequent

it unlikely that the difficulties

of interpreting abnormal bidder CARs around the event date
will hold for WKs.
Further,

we feel that our hypothesis will be

strengthened if the loss suffered by the WK around its bid
is sustained over the entire period for which the WK
participates

in the contest.

at any stage,
statistical

While we postulate no recovery

this conjecture has to be tested through the

significance of cumulative abnormal returns over
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time periods ending on the date of withdrawal of the HB,

and

the date of completion of the contest.
Another significant observation regarding the role of
the time

intervals

in hypothesis testing is

the WKs under the HHW market process,

in order.

For

it is of interest to

look at the effects of the second HB bid,

and the time

interval between the first WK bid and its immediately
preceding HB bid,
process.

for comparison with the standard bidding

On the other hand,

the differential

under the ASB market process will appear well
auction process,

impact of WKs
inside the

indicated in time intervals following the

first WK bid.10
The simple linear model specified in section 3.3.2
chapter 3

of

is estimated on the computer software package

SHAZAM using ordinary least squares regression.

The model

is checked for heteroskedasticity using the Goldfeld-Quandt
test.11

As per the requirements of the test,

the

observations are ordered according to the magnitude of the
explanatory variable

(number of days between the WK bid and

the preceding HB bid).

One-sixth of the observations at the

center of the range are excluded,
sized groups of observations,

leaving two nearly equal¬

one group corresponding to low

values of the chosen independent variable T and the other
group corresponding to high values.

Separate regressions

are run for the two groups of observations.
the sum of squared residuals

The ratio of

for the two regressions
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is an

F-statistic,

which is approximately unity if the error terms

are homoskedastic.
4.3 Methodology - Managerial Motivation
The incentive and monitoring variables as defined in
chapter 3

need to be structured for further analysis.

rate of return E(Rj)

The

for converting the managerial holdings

of stock and stock options to expected income is calculated
from the

following equation:12

E(R.})

where E(Rj)

=

Rf +

(0.0860

* Bj.)

= expected return on

(9)

'j'th stock.

Rf

= average annual

3 month Treasury bill rate.

6j

= Beta for stock

'j'.

0.0860 represents the average market premium for stock
returns over the risk free rate Rf.
Now,

for the

'j'th firm,

let

H mj-

= number of shares of common stock of the
firm held by managers.

HTj

= total number of shares of common stock of the
'j'th firm.

'j'th

SJ

= price of each share of common stock of the
'j'th firm.

V-

= value of each stock option of the

C-

= annual cash and cash-equivalent compensation
of the managers of the 'j'th firm.

D1

= book value of outstanding debt of the
firm.
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'j'th firm.

'j'th

Next,
COM,

for the managers,

OP and MGR

(as

let us define the variables

in Chapter 3,

section 4),

as under:

Annual expected income from stock holding
COM
Annual cash and cash-equivalent remuneration

Annual expected income from options holdings
OP
Annual cash and cash-equivalent remuneration

Further,

for the firm,

we define the variable DEQ as:

Book value of outstanding debt
DEQ
Market value of common stock

We also define the variable MGR as:

Total common stock held by managers
MGR
Total common stock of firm

For the

'j'th firm,

the above variables can then be

mathematically expressed as:

(Hmj * Sj)

* E (R,)

(io)

COMj =
Ci

°Pj.

V. * E (R:)13
_2--

(li)

cj
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DEQ,

=

(12)

---

(HIj * S;)

MGRj =
While

(Hmj. / HTj.)
all

the

(13)

other variables

suitable methodology

is

required

are

readily available,

for obtaining the value

a
of

vr
4.3.1 Valuation

of Executive

If the number of
by

'n',

average

the

These are

adopted to

price
Type

is

of data

the proxy

is

denoted

statements provided

relating to

listed below,

obtain consistent data

executive

along with the

average

stock

approach

on the number of

outstanding and their weighted

stock

exercise

for valuation purposes.
I:

The

number of

stock options

their weighted average
directly available
Type

outstanding

denoted by SP and the weighted

exercise price by XP,

options.

options

stock options

stock price

four different types

Stock Options

II:

The

number of

exercise price XP

from the proxy

stock options

directly available

outstanding

and

is

statements.

outstanding

from the proxy

'n'

'n'

statements

is
along

with the unrealized potential value UPV on the
relevant date.
to

In this

calculate the XP

UPV =

situation,

from the

[(SP - XP)
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*

n]

it

is possible

following equation:

(14)

The equation,

to yield correct results,

uses the

restrictive assumption that SP > XP for all
outstanding options 'n'

on the relevant date,

since only these options will have unrealized
potential value.
Type III:
(a)

The available data consists of:
The number of options granted during a period 'N1'
and its weighted average exercise price XP1.

(b)

The number of options exercised during the same
period XN2'

and the net value realized R.

In this situation,

one has to examine proxy

statements for the prior years till one finds a
statement where the executive stock options are
at least expressed as in Type II above,
opening inventory 'N'

to get an

of stock options with a

weighted average exercise price EP.
the end of period inventory 'n'

In this case,

and the weighted

average exercise price XP are given by:

n

=

(N + N1 - N2)

[ (N * EP) + (N1 * XP^ ]
Xp -(N + N1)

(15)

(16)

This process is repeated recursively for each
period till one reaches a date immediately
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prior to the contest.
be exact,

While this method seems to

there are two problems which result in

imprecision in measurement:
(i)

The time periods

for which the data are reported

in the annual proxy statements are not usually
back to back,
two months

and there can be overlaps of up to

in the reporting of this data in the

proxy statements

for any two successive years.

For the overlap not to affect

'n',

we need to

assume that the number of options granted during
each period of overlap is exactly equal to the
number of prior options exercised during that
period.

XP will always be somewhat affected due

to double counting of the options granted during
each period of overlap.
(ii)

The annual proxy statements sometimes provide
executive stock option data for five years
of one year.

instead

In the version of reporting being

presently described,

such five year data reduce

the inaccuracies due to reduction in the number of
periods of overlap.

Type IV:
(a)

The available data consists of:
The number of options granted during a period

'N^

and its weighted average exercise price XP1.
(b)

The net value realized R during the same period.
Here,

the procedure adopted in Type III above
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can be followed in respect of XP.
cannot be calculated as

'N2'

However,

'n'

is not available.

N2 has to be calculated from the following
construct:
[(SP,

- xp2)

[R/(SP,

Here,

*N2]

(17)

- XP2)]

(18)

XP2 is the weighted average exercise price

at the end of the preceding period
and SP1

(known to us),

is the price at which the option is

exercised,

which will

likely be the relative

stock price on the date of exercise.
on SP1

Since data

for options exercised is not available,

has to be proxied,
which R is known,

for the entire period for
by the average month-end price

of the relative stock for the period.
method enables us to calculate both
the

inaccuracies

While this

'n'

and XP,

increase when data on stock

options are available on a
basis

it

five year consolidated

(in contrast to Type III above),

is then calculated on a

since SP1

five year month-end

average.
The traditional method of valuing executive stock
options,

used by Lewellen,

Loderer and Martin

(1987),

value them in the year in which they are granted,
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is to

at their

end-of-year exercise value,

which is the difference between

year-end market price and exercise price.
then revised every year,

The estimate is

as the exercise value changes,

to the observed exercise date.

Smith and Zimmerman

up

(1976)

feel that this method grossly underestimates the option
value as

it does not consider the discounted exercise price.

Noreen and Wolfson
formulas

for warrants.

(1981)

derive a set of valuation

For some of these warrants which

have characteristics similar to executive stock options,

the

value of the warrant is given by the Black-Scholes valuation
formula which allows

for continuously paid dividends.

This

expression has been used for valuing stock options by Murphy
(1985),
(i)

with some simplifying assumptions as under:

Executive stock options are valued when they are
granted.

(ii)

Options are granted at an exercise price equal to the
market price on the date of the grant.

In actual practice,

the exercise price is very close to the

market price for the stock on the date of the grant.
There are a number of market imperfections affecting
the valuation of executive stock options.

These are:

(i)

The options are not transferable.

(ii)

The executive loses the right to exercise the options
if he/she does not remain with the
satisfy stated criteria.
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firm long enough to

(iii)

Construction of appropriate riskless hedges

is

impeded

by restrictions against insider trading.
These restrictions tend to reduce the value of the option,
since they increase the probability that the option will not
eventually be exercised.

The Black-Scholes

formula will

thus likely overestimate the true value of the option,

and

provide an upper bound.
Smith and Zimmerman

(1976)

propose a method of valuing

executive stock options which does not make any assumptions
regarding the future distribution of stock prices.
formulation,
option,

Their

though not providing a precise value for the

does give a lower bound on the option's value.

It

is based on the inference that the non-zero value of the
option

(at the time it is granted)

is not less than the

difference between the current stock price and the
discounted future cash flows
The

from exercising the option.

future cash flows consist of the cost of exercising X,

and the

foregone dividends D,

on foregone dividends.
and Mandelker

(1987),

adjusted for foregone interest

The method has been used by Agrawal
and is also used by us14 in the

analysis with the assumptions stated thereagainst.
value of each executive stock option be 0,

0 > Max

[0,

S -

(X + D)B]
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then

(19)

If the

where

D

=

T
S [d
t=l

B

=

[1 /

T

=

assumed to be 5 years
outstanding.

dt =

*

(1 + r)1-']

(20)

(1 + r)T]

(21)
for all options

dividend per share declared in year t.15

r

=

risk free rate, proxied by annual
Treasury Bill rate.

3 month

X

=

weighted average exercise price of options
outstanding.

S

=

stock price immediately prior to the contest on
the date for which the option data is provided
in the proxy statement.

B

=

price of riskless discounted bond.

The use of the lower bound will obviously undervalue
the stock options.
imperfections

However,

because of all the market

for executive stock options cited earlier,

the true value of the option will be less than its estimated
value.

Smith and Zimmerman thus

feel that the true value

will thus be closer to the lower bound derived from their
valuation expression.

The method

(as also that of Murphy)

has an upward bias as

it does not adjust for dilution

occurring from exercise of the options.
expected to be very small,

However,

this

is

since outstanding options rarely

exceed more than one or two percent of the outstanding
common stock,

and many of these options expire unexercised.
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If the number of options outstanding is given by

'n',

then the value V of the outstanding option holding for the
principal executive officers of a firm is given by:

V =

4.3.2

(n * 0)

(22)

Statistical Testing of Hypotheses
For each of the variables COM,

above,

OP,

DEQ,

as defined

arithmetic means and variances about the mean are

separately calculated for the different groups of interest.
Difference between the means of the WK and the HB,
WK and the non-HHW WK,

the HHW WK and the HB,

the non-HHW WK

and the HB,

and the ASB WK and the non-ASB WK,

statistical

significance by a t-test,

that the variables
distributed,

the HHW

is tested for

under the assumption

in both the groups are normally

and the variable in both the groups

is

characterized by the same unknown population variance
In such a case,

the test statistic T is given by16

(Mt

- M2)

(23)

T

[syfl/n^ + U+n.,) ]

p

where

s

[ (n-,-1)
s,2
+ (n2-l)s22]
*
I
r
I
'
C
-(n1 + n2 - 2)
w

and

Hy = mean of sample 1
/x2 = mean of sample 2
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(24)

a2.

n1 = size of sample 1
n2 = size of sample 2
s*=

unbiased estimator of a2 from sample 1

s22= unbiased estimator of a2 from sample 2

The test statistic T then follows a studentized t
distribution with

(n1+n2-2)

degrees of freedom.

To account for the existence of outliers,

if any,

in

the data, which will likely vitiate the assumption of
normality required for the t-test, we also conduct the nonparametric Wilcoxon Test17 on the same data sets to test
for the difference of medians between the two groups.
perform the test,

To

the observations in both the groups are

put together and ranked in order of increasing size.

The

test statistic W is the sum of ranks of the first group.
n1 > 10 or n2 > 10,

If

the sampling distribution of W rapidly

approaches that of a normal distribution with mean /xg and
variance a2u, where

Mu

=

o2u =

and a2u are given by

[n, * (n2 + 1) ]
2

(25)

[n1*n2*(n1 + n2 + 1) ]
12

(26)

The significance of an observed value W can then be
determined by calculating the value of Z,

as follows, which

is distributed with zero mean and unit variance:
93

z

(W ±

.5 - Mw)
(27)

In the next phase, we seek to establish that
(a)

the 2 day CAR for the bidders can be explained by the
explanatory variables relating to incentive and
monitoring defined earlier,

(b)

and

the model is structurally different for the HB,

the HHW

WK and the non-HHW WK.
As a first step,

we scrutinize the independent

variables for multicollinearity by looking at the
correlation matrix and the auxiliary regressions involving
each of the explanatory variables as the dependent variable
and the other two variables as independent variables.

Next,

we conduct a Chow test18 on the model to look for
structural changes between the three groups in explaining
the dependent variable.

The test is conducted by first

considering the model as unrestricted where the coefficients
of the explanatory variables can take different values for
the HB,

the HHW WK and the non-HHW WK.

In effect,

we have

three regression equations in the same variables with
different values for the estimators of each of the
coefficients in the three groups.

The sum of the squared

residuals from the mean of each of these regression
equations, when added up,

provides the residual sum of

squares of the unrestricted model,
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RSSy.

We then consider

the model as a restricted model by assuming that there is no
difference between the three groups.

This implies that the

coefficients of the explanatory variables are identical
across the three groups,

and the corresponding regression

can then be run on stacked data from all the three groups,
treating the data as if they originate from the same
population.

The sum of the squared residuals from the mean

of this regression equation yields the residual sum of
squares of the restricted model,

RSSr.

The appropriate test

statistic T to test the null hypothesis of no structural
change is then given by:

where

T

=

[(RSSr - RSSU)/2K]
-R_-_u[RSS^ (n.,+n2+n3-3K) ]

K

=

number of regressors

(28)

(including the

intercept)
n1

=

number of observations for HHW WK

n2

=

number of observations for non-HHW WK

n3

=

number of observations for HB.

The test statistic follows the F distribution with 2K
numerator degrees of freedom and

(n,,+n2+n3-3K)

denominator

degrees of freedom.
The final model based on the results of the Chow Test
is then tested for heteroskedasticity using White's test.19
The test examines whether the error variance is affected by
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any of the explanatory variables,
products.

their squares or their

The test statistic is computed as the sample size

N times the R2 from a regression of the squares of the
residuals of the original regression equation as the
dependent variable and the explanatory variables of the
original regression,

their squares and their products as the

independent variables.

The test statistic is asymptotically

distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to
the number of regressors

(not counting the constant)

in the

regression used to obtain the statistic.
The next chapter details the results obtained through
an analysis of the data as per the methodology elaborated
above,

and the extent of supporting evidence for the various

hypotheses set out in Chapter 3.
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ENDNOTES

1.

Tender offers are directly made to the target firm's
shareholders who decide individually whether or not to
tender their shares for sale to the bidding firm.
Mergers are negotiated directly with the target's
managers and approved by its board before going to a
vote of its shareholders for approval.
Proxy contests
occur when an insurgent group attempts to gain
controlling seats on the board of directors.

2.

All

3.

Mitchell and Lehn (1990) use a similar collection of
firms in their sample selection of bidders.

4.

DJNS provides information from June 1979 onwards. We
conduct the search using key expressions relating to
White Knight transactions.

5.

Executive stock options, which are a part of deferred
remuneration realizable in the near term horizon, have
been considered as a separate variable.

6.

In an article on measuring executive compensation,
Antle and Smith (1985) point out the difficulties of
obtaining the closing inventory of executive stock
options from company furnished public data, and
recommend the need for the use of approximations in
this regard - see Appendix B of their paper.

7.

In Corporate Finance. Ross And Westerfield (1987)
calculate the average risk premium to be 8.6% for all
stocks for the period 1926-1986 - p 128.

8.

The value of sJt2

such subsequent bidders who are successful in
acquiring the target are termed as WKs by Bradley,
Desai and Kim (1988) .

jt

= s

(1 + 1 +

is given by

(I^-Rh)2/

°J(*W

-

T=1

Di

where
Sj2

= residual variance for security j from the market
model regression,
Dj
= number of observations during the estimation
period,
RMt = rate of return on the market index for day t of
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the event period,
Rn

= mean rate of return on the market index during
the estimation period, and
RMt = rate of return on the market for day r of the
estimation period.

9.

Roll (1986) mentions that the market may not react to
the immediate announcement of a bid since the bid may
be anticipated, and may convey strategic information
about the bidder other than that it is seeking a
combination with a particular target.

10.

The measurement over extended intervals implicit in the
formulation raises significant empirical issues.
The
larger the time intervals over which abnormal CARs are
calculated, the farther one moves from the comparison
period, and there can be problems with the stability of
the beta used for predicting returns on which CARs are
based.
In this situation, the likelihood of extraneous
firm-specific events creeping in is greater.
While
these difficulties are noteworthy, we believe that the
robustness of the method, the economic magnitudes
observed, and the absence of contradictory inferences
will evidence the appropriateness of our use of the
procedures.

11.

For a description of the Goldfeld-Quandt test, see
Kmenta, Principles of Econometrics. 2nd Ed., 292-294.

12.

The equation is based on the Capital Asset Pricing
Model, according to which
E(Rj)

= Rf +

[E(Rm)

- Rf]

* (3.}

A value of 0.0860 has been assigned to [E^)
based on historical data from 1926-1986.
13.

- Rf]

For calculating the expected income from executive
stock options, the holding of options should properly
be multiplied by the rate of return on the option,
which is related to the rate of return on the
underlying stock through the expression:
[E(Rcj)

- Rf] = n *

n

(aCj/Cj) -s- (aSj/Sj)
= expected return on common stock.
= expected return on call option on the common
stock.
= risk-free rate.
= value of call option on stock.
= value of stock.

E(Rj)
E(Rcj)
Rf
Cj
Sj

[E(Rj)

- Rf], where

=
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Omega is defined as the option's elasticity.
To
facilitate the analysis, we assume that all the
executive stock options have unit elasticity, resulting
in the rate of return on the option being equal to the
rate of return on the stock. This assumption is not
unreasonable if we consider that the options are
usually not deep out-of-the-money (in tune with their
incentive feature) and have a relatively long time to
expiration - see Cox and Rubinstein, Options Markets,
pp. 185-193 and pp. 228-229.
14.

The method of Murphy (1985) and that of Smith and
Zimmerman (1976), are both formulated to value
executive stock options granted. We look upon all
outstanding executive stock options on a particular
date with a given weighted average exercise price as if
the options were granted on that date with an exercise
price equal to the given weighted average exercise
price.
This violates the assumption of Murphy (1985)
that options are granted at an exercise price equal to
the market price on the date of the grant. Accordingly,
we have adopted the method of Smith and Zimmerman
(1976) for valuing executive stock options.

15.

We assume constant payout over the life of the option.
The variable 'd' is assumed to be the dividend paid in
the year prior to the announcement of the event.

16.

For a description of the t-test,
of Econometrics. 2nd ed., 145.

17.

The Wilcoxon test is a nonparametric test whose
power-efficiency is close to 95% of the t-test even for
moderate-sized samples. For a detailed description of
the test, see Siegel and Castellan, Nonparametric
Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences. 2nd Ed.,
128-137.

18.

For details on the construction of the Chow Test in
different circumstances, and different ways of setting
up the test, see Kmenta, Principles of Econometrics.
2nd Ed., 420-422; Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics. 2nd
Ed., 87-88 and 186.

19.

For a detailed description of White's test and the
related Breusch-Pagan test, see Kmenta, Principles
of Econometrics. 2nd Ed., 294-296, and Kennedy, A Guide
to Econometrics. 2nd Ed., 108.
The Goldfeld-Quandt
test was not used due to difficulties in identifying
the explanatory variable with which the error term is
correlated in the multiple regression context.
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

5.1

Results Relating to Bidding Behavior

5.1.1 Review of Bidding Data
Mergerstat Review,
yields 67 WKs

which tracks only successful WKs,

for the period 1978-1987.

These include

preemptive friendly offers when target firms are expecting
hostile bids,1
parties"

subsequent non-collaborative bids by "third

in multiple bidding situations,

collaborative

(WK)

bids by private firms.

Retrieval Service yields 266 cases,

and subsequent
Dow Jones News

of which there are 33

cases definitionally equivalent and non-overlapping to the
cases

from Mergerstat Review,

except that they also

incorporate unsuccessful cases.
are

Thus,

100 control contests

identified from primary sources and subjected to the

final definitional and data criteria for sample

inclusion.

After obtaining the short-list of 100 cases,
Street Journal

Index for the relevant years,

the Wall

and the actual

Wall Street Journal articles are scrutinized to select the
cases which conform to the definition of WKs stated at the
beginning of Chapter 4.
in Table 1

The manner of selection is detailed

(on the next page).

Exclusion of cases having

confounding events lead to the final sample of 62 WK
contests of which 57

involve exchange-listed firms.2

firms have each been WKs on two separate occasions.
are considered as six different cases,

as there is no

Three
They

Table 1.
Sample Selection from Control Contests
Involving "White Knights"

Description of column headings:
EXCH

:Subsequent collaborative bidders - exchange listed.

PTC

:Subsequent collaborative bidders -

PVT

:Subsequent collaborative bidders - private firms.

PRE

:Preemptive friendly offers when target is expecting a
hostile bid - private firms indicated in brackets.

"over the counter".

NOCOL:Subsequent non-collaborative bidders
bidding situations.
CONF

:

Confounding events.

NOINF:No

YEAR

in multiple

information in Wall Street Journal

EXCH

OTC

PVT

PRE

NOCOL

Index.

CONF

NOINF TOTAL

1978

1

1

—

2(1)

1

—

1

6

1979

8

—

—

—

2

—

—

10

1980

9

—

—

2(1)

1

1

—

13

1981

10

—

1

—

—

2

—

13

1982

4

—

1

—

—

—

—

5

1983

5

—

1

—

1

—

—

7

1984

4

1

2

—

—

—

—

7

1985

9

1

2

1(1)

—

1

—

14

1986

5

1

7

3(2)

—

1

1

18

1987

2

1

4

—

—

—

—

7

57

5

18

8(5)

5

5

2

100
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overlap in the time span of the contests

(from the date of

the first HB bid to the date of completion of the WK bid)
for the WKs

involved.3

For each of the 62 public WKs in

the sample,

the target is a public company.

Ten targets are

OTC firms and one is a Canadian firm.
There are 62 HB cases corresponding to the WK sample,
of which 57

are bids,

four are proxy contests and three are

open market purchases with hostile intent.
sample contests are public companies,
firms.

46 HBs

in the

of which four are OTC

Over the entire ten year period of study,

two of the

HBs appear subsequently in other contests as a WK.
the WKs appear as HBs

in subsequent contests

In terms of the bidding variations
there are 16 HHW WKs and 9 ASB WKs.

HHHW).

in these contests,

the WK bid follows

(the bidding sequence being

Only one HHW WK overlaps with an ASB WK,

bidding sequence is HHWHW.
bidding
cases,

involving WKs.

In one instance,

considered as part of the HHW process,
three consecutive bids by the HB

For 7 ASB WKs,

(bidding sequence HW)

None of

i.e.

the

the sequential

occurs twice.

In two other

it is repeated three times and four times

respectively.
5.1.2

Event Time Description
The following event dates are identified when examining

the results of control contests
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involving WKs:

HOSTILE BIDS
D1

Date of

first bid by HB.

D1'

Date of subsequent bid by the HB
market process)

D.,' *

(in the HHW

following its own first bid D1.

Date of each subsequent bid by the HB following
the WK bid - occurs

in the ASB market process.

WHITE KNIGHT BIDS
D2

Date of

first bid by WK.

D2‘

Date of each subsequent bid by the WK following
the HB bid - occurs in the ASB market process.

D2''

Date of the last bid by the WK prior to the
withdrawal of HB - occurs

in the ASB market

process.

EVENT COMPLETION
D3

Date of withdrawal of HB.

D4

Date of completion of WK transaction.4

In our empirical analysis,
two types of event windows,
variable

interval.

we focus our attention on

the fixed interval and the

In the tables describing the results,

fixed intervals are denoted by

(Dp-q,

Dp) ,

where

*p'

is a

number representing the appropriate event date as per the
classification above,

and

'q*

represents the

Variable intervals are represented by
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(Dp+1,

fixed interval.
Dr) ,

where

'p'

and

'r'

are numbers representing the appropriate event dates

bounding the contest-specific variable as per the
classification above.
The variable

intervals

trading days denoted by /x)

(and their mean values

between the defined event dates

can be related to the market process as
(D,+l,

D2)

in

follows:

The time taken by the WK to enter the
contest,

after its initiation

HHW environment,
further split

this

into

(/x=27) .

In the

interval needs to be

(D1+1,D1')

to examine the differential

and

(D1,+1,D2)

impact of the

second HB bid.
(d2+i,

d3)

The length of the auction process
the ASB environment,

(/x=ll) .

In

the differentiated

impact of subsequent bids by HB and WK can be
examined by considering each ASB as a
sequential collection of standard bidding
situations and splitting the
(D2+1,D11 ') ,
(D, + l,

D3)

(D,"+1,D2')

and

interval

into

(D2 • '+1, D3) .5

The time spent by the HB in the contest
(M=38).

(d2+i,

d4)

The time spent by the WK in the contest
(M=46).

(D,+l,

D4)

The length of the contest
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(/x=73) .

The average interval
process,

lengths indicate that the auction

from the moment it is triggered by the WK bid,

the withdrawal of the HB,

takes considerably less time than

the control contest as a whole,
lasting 4

days or less.

to

with half of the auctions

This makes

it realistic to apply

the intuition of the English auction while interpreting
results.6
However,
intervals,

in commenting upon the average lengths of

we note that the averages are generally

unrepresentative of typical control contest scenarios,
to large dispersions about the mean.
length of the auction process ranges

For example,
from 0 days

withdraws on the same day that the WK makes
days

(an ASB market process).

The total

control contest process ranges
5.1.3

due

the

(the HB

its bid)

to 81

length of the

from 17 days to 242

days.

Control Features of HBs
The relative sizes of the two categories of bidders

the control contest are examined.

This

in

is motivated by the

premise that any wide disparity in this regard will
complicate drawing conclusions based on a comparison of the
market response to bids for the WK and the HB.
if one of the categories
other,

the differential

For example,

is considerably smaller than the
impact of potential resource-based

constraints on the respective bidding behavior cannot be
ignored.

As a proxy for size,

we use the market value of

common equity for the firm two days prior to their first
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bid,

i.e.

on day D^-2

and D2-2

As shown subsequently,
CARs

for the

date D2-2

for HBs and WKs respectively.

the WKs have significant negative

interval D2-l to D2.

The value of the WK on

can thus be said to have preceded the impact of

the WK bid,

since there is little evidence of earlier

security price reactions.
Table 2 below shows the size distribution of WKs and
HBs respectively based on identified value ranges.

For each

Table 2.

Comparison of Size Profiles of "White Knights11
and Hostile Bidders

“WHITE KNIGHTS” fN=57)
ProporMean
negative
tion(%)
CAR
CAR(%)

Value
Range

HOSTILE BIDDERS(N=42)
ProporMean
negative
tion(%)
CAR
CAR(%)

($/mil)
< 500

32

- 2.1

67

40

-

0.7

59

500 to

16

- 3.7

89

21

- 0.9

66

37

- 3.5

86

33

+

1.5

55

15

- 4.7a

77a

- 1.7

100

1000
1000 to
5000
> 5000

6

The "white knights" in this value range include Dow
Chemical Co., which is really one of the outliers with
a strong dollar gain different from the pattern
observed in other "white knights". As such, these
numbers have a positive bias.
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of the value ranges,

the table also shows the distribution

of positive and negative CARs and the mean two day CAR
ending on the date of their first bid.

Three distinct

conclusions can be drawn from this table.
(i)

The WKs are generally comparable in size to the HBs,
although they tend to be slightly larger.

As such,

it

is appropriate to compare the market response to the
two categories of bidders to strengthen our
interpretation of the event study results.
(ii)

The average two day CARs

for WKs ending with their

first bid are notably negative.
average two day CARs
mixed,

On the other hand,

for HBs ending with their bids are

with the average two day CAR for a relatively

large size category of HBs being positive.
for HBs

the

The profile

is consistent with the inconclusive results

obtained by researchers examining bidder returns

in

takeovers.
(iii) The average negative CAR for the WK portfolio tends to
increase as

firm size increases.

This

is consistent

with the notion that a larger size can imply greater
potential

for agency conflict.

5.1.4 Overall Results
Table 3
and the CAR

(on next page)

reports the abnormal return

(beginning at D2-10)

the interval ending with D2,

for each of the 10 days

(AR)
in

and also the CAR for three

fixed time intervals relative to D2.
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The results in panel A

Table 3
Abnormal Return (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)
for "White Knights11 for the Event Period -9 Trading Days to
+10 Trading Days from its Bid Date
(N=57)
PANEL A:

AR

= daily average market-adjusted abnormal return.

CAR'

= cumulative sum of the daily average abnormal return.

ar

Date in
event time
-

kk

9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

-

-

-

m

0.08
0.02
0.05
0.13
0.03
0.11
0.06
0.18
1.59
1.72

CAR'

(%)

0.08
0.06
0.11
0.26
0.23
0.34
0.40
0.22
- 1.37
- 3.09

(t-statis

-

-

-

0.25
0.07
0.15
0.39
0.10
0.32
0.18
0.54
**
5.41
5.97

a=0.01

PANEL B.

CAR = mean cumulative abnormal return

Period in
event time
+
+

1
to
0
1 to + 5
1 to + 10

CAR

m

(Z-statistic)

0.11

- 11.75
0.12

0.33

0.52

3.31

. .

a=0 01
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-

kk

show that the excess returns are sharply negative at D2-l
and D2.

Also,

the t-statistic for D2-l and D2 is significant

even at a=0.01,

thereby rejecting the null hypothesis that

the abnormal returns on the event date are zero.
B of the table,
for intervals
insignificant.

From panel

we observe that the Z-scores for the CARs

(D2+l,

D2+5)

and

In panel A,

(D2+l,

D2+10)

are

the t-statistics for ARs prior to

D2“l are also seen to be insignificant.

From these results

we can make three inferences.
(i)

There seems to be little leakage of information
regarding the impending bid of the WK.
significant average CAR of -3.3%

There is a

from D2-l to D2 and no

evidence of material reaction before,

as against a

significant average CAR of -2.6% between D1
shown in Table 4
(ii)

as

(on the next page).

There is no recovery of the losses
the WK bid,

and D2,

immediately after

with the average CAR being insignificant at

+0.3% between D2+l and D2+10.
of the auction is

11 days

Since the average length

(median 4 days),

this lends

support to the notion that the negative reaction of the
WK shareholders is unaffected by the outcome of the
contest.
(iii) If the WK bid at D2 is perceived as an antitakeover
strategy by the WK,

then the negative reaction of the

market is quite consistent with market reaction to most
other antitakeover strategies where stockholder
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Table

CARS

for

4.

"White Kniahts" and Hostile
Selected Intervals

KNIGHTS"
IHiH571

"WHITE

CAR r %)

Interval

D,,-50 ,

D,

Dr4,

D1

Drl,

D,

d2-i,

HOSTILE BIDDERS
fN=42)

negative
CAR

CAR (% )

%

neaative
CAR

1.9

54.39

0.8

50.00

0.7

50.88

„ _*
1.8

47.50

-

0.2

52.63

0.1

60.00

-

_
**
3.3

77.19

1.3**

42.86

-

2.6

68.42

3.1**

47.50

-

1.1

48.98

2.1*

64.86

-

1.9

49.09

-

5.6**

61.40

-

°2

%

Bidders;

•tele

D,+l,

D2

d2+i,

D3

d2+i.
D,+l,

D4
D4

-

_a

_a

_a

_a

a=0.01.

*

a=0.10.

3

For hostile bidders, the transaction is completed on
when they (or the unsuccessful "white knights")
withdraw

from the contest.

approval

is

not required

(Jarrell,

Brickley and Netter,

1988).7
Further strong evidence
is

evident

of negative

returns

from the percentage of positive
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for the WK

and negative

returns,
Table 4

for the intervals

including D2,

(on previous page).

interval

(D2-l,

D2) ,

as reported in

This reveals that over the

77.2% of the average CARs among WK

firms are negative.

43.9% of the average CARs are

significantly negative at a=0.10

(22.81% at a=0.01).

In

contrast,

only 22.8% of average CARs among firms are

positive.

1.75% of these CARs are positive and significant

at a=0.10

(0% at a=0.01).8

WK firms

(22.8%)

It is noteworthy that of the

that show positive CARs,

bidding process after two bids by the HB
White Squires

(see footnote 3

13

7 WKs enter the
(HHW),

in Chapter 1)

two are

for whom the

bids are perhaps more in the nature of an investment and
there is no

intention to acquire control,

and two WKs

(one

in prior contests

overlapping with HHW)

are unsuccessful HBs

involving other WKs.

This last category is thus presumably

firms with acquisition plans awaiting implementation.

For

the firms having negative CARs,

there are no White Squires

or WKs who are unsuccessful HBs

in prior control contests

involving WKs.

This

is consistent with the notion that the

managers of the WK may not be acting in the best interests
of the shareholders when making their bid for the target.
From the CARs

for the variable length intervals,

we

further note that a significant negative CAR for the
portfolio of all WKs occurs only in intervals

including the

2 day window from D2-l to D2.

including

(D2-l,

D2)

Also,

intervals

but longer than that two day window show
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significant negative average CARs larger than that for the
two day window,

implying that there is no prior gain or

subsequent recovery of the losses

incurred from D2-l to D2.

The pattern is essentially the same for the subsample of
successful WKs.

In a statistical

conclude that overall,

we can thus

shareholders of WK firms do lose on

announcement of the WK bid,
gains,

sense,

which is not a loss of prior

and is not recovered up to the completion of the

contest.

These results enable us to focus primarily on the

two day window from D2-l to D2,

to study differences

return vectors based on structural differences

in

in the

bidding process.
As
Table 2
size

far as the HBs are concerned,
(on page 106)

it is apparent

that the negative CARs

for HBs

intervals are smaller than the negative CARs

equivalent sized WKs.

Also,

for the control

the proportion of positive CARs

from
in most

for

sample of HBs,

for the two day interval

prior to and including their first bid on D1
larger than that in the sample of WKs

(40%)

is much

for the two day

interval prior to and including their first bid at D2

(22%).

The CAR profile for the overall control HB group during and
after their bid is also reported in Table 4
Interestingly,

Table 4

(on page 110).9

reveals a completely different

pattern regarding the abnormal return structure

for the HBs,

when compared to the WK bidders.

In contrast to the market

reaction around the WK bid,

is no impact for the HB

there
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bid in the interval

(D^l,

positive CAR of +1.8%

D1),

and a significant average

from 0^4 to D1.

gain between D^l and D2,

There

is higher,

for WKs.

The proportion of

and the difference between

percentage of positive and negative CARs
pronounced as

further

with a significant average

positive CAR of +3.1% during this period.
average positive CARs

is a

is not as

The WK bid at D2 causes a

significant positive reaction for HB stock values.
auction theory,

the higher WK bid signifies that the value

of the firm is at least as much as the HB bid for it
next highest bid).

This

after the WK bid.

However,

the situation changes

The prior gains of the HBs seem to

with a significant negative CAR of -2.1% between

D2+l and D3.

The return pattern of the HBs

that of bidders

is similar to

for whom hostile takeover bids

reported by Bradley,
their work,

(the

information likely causes the

market to react positively.

dissipate,

From

Desai and Kim

(1983).

as

As noted in

gain to bidders from hostile bids,

synergistic possibilities,

failed,

based on

dissipated as it became clearer

that the targets may not be taken over.
Overall,

nothing material happens regarding HB abnormal

returns over the period D1 to D3,

and gradual gains up to

the WK bid are lost subsequently.

The contrast between the

HB effects and the WK bid outcome

(where losses up to D2 are

sustained up to D3) ,

provides evidence of the differing

motivations of the HB and WK bidders
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in control contests.

5.1.5 Results

for HHW WKs

The market responses to WK participation when the WK
bids after two consecutive HB bids

(HHW market process),

shown in Table 5

The complementary

(on next page).10

situation of market response during identical
variable
bid

intervals

relevant

is shown alongside the corresponding CARs
A scrutiny of the results over the

fixed and variable

support for the

intervals

indicates strong

"Correlated Values" Hypothesis.

suffer a much smaller negative reaction,
terms,

fixed and

for WKs who bid immediately after a HB

(non-HHW WKs),

for the HHW WKs.

are

than their counterparts.

abnormal negative CAR for WKs
than that for non-HHW WKs.

The HHW WKs

in percentage

Around the WK bid,

in the HHW process

Between D1

the entire length of the contest,

and D2,

is

the
less

and also over

the non-HHW WKs have

significant negative returns, whereas the CARs for the HHW
WKs over these same
different

intervals are not significantly

from zero.

the WK bid,

Also,

for the two day interval around

non-HHW WKs have a substantially larger number

of negative abnormal

returns

significant at a=0.10)

(85.37%,

with 51.22% being

than the HHW WKs

25.00% being significant at a=0.10).

(56.25%,11

Finally,

with

the two day

positive CAR portfolio for WKs consists of 54% of the HHW
WKs and 13% of the non-HHW WKs.
if we exclude non-HHW WKs who are
investment strategy.

114

The latter goes down to 7%
identifiably following an

Table 5

CARs for the Set of "White Knights'1 Where its First Bid is
Preceded bv Two Consecutive Hostile Bids (HHW Process); and
the Complementary Set of “White Knights" (NON-HHW Process)
Selected Intervals

"WHITE KNIGHTS"
NON-HHW PROCESS
(N=41)

HHW PROCESS
(N=16)

Interval

D.j-50,

CAR(%)

% neaative
CAR

CAR(%)

% necrat:
CAR

- 1.6

56.25

- 2.1

53.66

Dr4,

D1

1.6

50.00

0.3

51.22

Drl,

D1

- 0.9

50.00

0.0

53.66

D/-4,

D,'

V1'

Dl'

d2-i,

D2

D,+lf

3.5**

21.25

_a

_a

2.6**

25.00

_a

_a

1.0**

56.25

V

1.4

43.75

D/+1,

°2

- 5.4**

68.75

D,+l,

D2

- 4.0

68.75

- 2.0

d2+i,

D3

-

1.2

50.00

-

1.1

48.57

d2+i.

D4

1.4

31.25

- 3.2

56.41

D^l,

D4

- 3.8

62.50

- 6.2**

60.98

-

- 4.1**

85.37

_a

_a

_a

_a

_

**

68.29

a=0.01
The event date D1'
processes.

does not exist for non-HHW
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The significantly positive reaction of the HHW WKs to
the second bid of the HB,
page),

as seen from Table 5

is difficult to explain,

(on previous

unless the possibility of

some leakage of information is admitted.

Thus,

in the HHW

market process where the control contest is well under way
with the first HB bid,

the market may become aware of the

identity of the WK firm as a potential bidder.
bid of the HB will then signify
"correlated" values)

The second

(in the context of

a higher value for the target,

as

it

will most likely be the second highest bid of the auction.
This additional

information about the value of the target,

being made available to the WK through the second HB bid,
can enable the WK to make a more
chose to do so.

"appropriate" bid if

it

We offer this as a possible explanation as

to why the market reacts

favorably regarding the WK stock

price when the second HB bid is made,

in contests

subsequently identified to be HHW contests.

The longer HHW

process can also imply more information flow to the market.
Since firms have resisted once,

the market may expect a WK

and have identified possible WK candidates.
the WK can then be less of a surprise,

The entry of

and this additionally

explains why there is less negative reaction over the two
day window ending D2 for HHW WKs,

as compared to non-HHW

WKs.
Table 6 below reports the results of the regression
model

specified in equation

(1)
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in Chapter 3.

The

F-statistic is significant at a=0.01.

We are unable to

reject homoscedasticity using the Goldfeld-Quandt test.

The

estimator of the coefficient of the dummy variable
representing HHW market process

is positive and significant,

providing further support to the

"Correlated Values"

Table 6.

Multiple Regression to Evaluate the Impact of the HHW Market
Process and the Time Between the "White Knight" Bid and the
preceding Hostile Bid on the Two Day CAR Ending on the Date
of the "White Knight" Bid
(N=57)
Explanatory Variables:
D

= 1, if WK bid follows 2 HB bids (HHW process).
= 0 otherwise (sequential bidding between HB and WK).

T

= time interval between WK bid and prior HB bid.

Dependent variable:
CAR

= two day market adjusted mean cumulative abnormal
return for the WK ending on the date of its first
bid.

MODEL:
CAR =

a

+

B1

VARIABLE
CONSTANT
D
T
Adjusted R2 = 0.14

*

D

+

B2*T

COEFFICIENT
a
bi

+

€

VALUE

t-STATISTIC

- 0.0519

- 6.15

0.0335

2.99

0.0005

1.85

hypothesis.
intercept,

The negative and significant estimator of the
larger than the positive estimator for the DUMMY

coefficient,

shows that the CAR is likely to be negative,

and this will be reduced if the WK bid is under the HHW
process.

The estimator of the coefficient of the variable T

is also positive and significant,

indicating that better

appraisal of the target reduces the probability of
overpayment.

For a sufficiently long time interval,

may also be positive.

the CAR

Solving the equation yields a

critical time interval of 36.8 days for the CAR to be zero
for the WKs under the HHW process.
non-HHW process,
103.8 days.
WKs

For the WKs under the

this critical time interval goes up to

In the sample,

the mean interval

for the HHW

is calculated to be 17 days after the second HB bid.

The same mean for non-HHW WKs

is 24 days.

The likelihood of

a positive CAR is thus seen to be more in the case of WKs
under the HHW process.
5.1.6 Results

for ASB WKs

All WKs in the ASB market process are successful
acquiring the targets.

The market reaction for these WKs

during the relevant variable intervals,
results

for the control

in

sample of HBs,

and corresponding
are presented in

Table 7 next.
It is evident from the results reported in the table
that for the ASB market process,
is strongly supported.

the Repetition Hypothesis

Every subsequent bid of the WK is
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Table 7.

CARs for the Set of "White Knights11 and Hostile Bidders
Where the First "White Knight11 Bid is Followed bv One or
More Sequences of Hostile and “White Knight” Bidding (ASB
Process) ; and the Complementary Set of "White Knights11 and
Hostile Bidders (NON-ASB Process); Selected Intervals

"WHITE KNIGHTS"
(N=9a)
CAR
Percent
neaative
1%1
CAR

Interval

HOSTILE BIDDERS
INzl6!1
CAR
Percent
Ill neaative
CAR

ASB PROCESS:

d2+i,

Dj

7.6**

71.78

-

1.1

50.00

d2+i,

V

0.1

50.00

-

1.1

62.50

D, * '+1/

D2'

2.7**

63.64

1.3

18.18

d2"+i,

d3

4.7**

87.50

- 2.0

85.71

0.4

42.50

- 2.3*

67.74

NON-ASB PROCESSb:
d2+i,

d3

a=0.01.
a=0.10.

The existence of more than one follow up sequence of
hostile and "white knight" bids in 2 ASB contests led
respectively to a total of 12 observations in the
analysis of "white knights" and 8 observations in the
analysis of hostile bidders.

There are 48 "white knights"
in this category.
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and 36 hostile bidders

met by strong disapproval
significant CAR of -2.7%

from the market,

for the WKs over the interval

subsequent HB bids to subsequent WK bids
D2').

There is a

last WK bid,

indicated by the

(i.e.,

from

D^'+l to

further significant loss of 4.7% after the

until the HB withdraws.

These findings suggest

that after the resolution of all uncertainty as to whether
it will prevail,
its

"victory"

the market gives the WK a

in the contest.

final penalty for

In the interval

the significant negative CAR for the ASB WKs

is

(D2+l,

D3) ,

-7.6%,

which

can be readily contrasted with the absence of any
significant reaction during this
WKs

[CAR = +0.4

contrast,

interval

for the non-ASB

(z=1.06 - not reported in the Table)].

from the summary of the ASB market process

in Table 7,

In

for HBs

we observe no significant reaction on the HB to

any of the subsequent bids,

whether made by the HB or by the

WK.
The evidence cited above illustrates that grouping all
subsequent bids

in one category as multiple bidding

situations may be misleading if there is no control
characteristics of the
market process,

firms making the bids.

for the

In the ASB

both the HB and the WK make subsequent bids.

The subsequent bids have no significant impact on the HB,
irrespective of which bidder makes the subsequent bid.
However,

the

impact on the WK is determined by the

making the subsequent bid.
there

firm

If it happens to be the WK,

is a strong negative reaction,
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as

in the case of its

first bid.

However,

if the HB makes the subsequent bid,

WK remains essentially unaffected.

the

This result further

suggests that the motivations for the WK bid are likely to
be different from the motivations for the HB bid.
5.2 Results Relating to Managerial Motivation
5.2.1 Review of Observed Data
In carrying out the analysis on managerial motivation,
it is observed that proxy statements containing information
on executive compensation and executive holdings of stock
and stock options are not filed by firms incorporated in
foreign countries whose stocks traded on the exchange
through American Depository Receipts
such firms

in the sample of WKs

HHW or an ASB bidding process)
sample of HBs.

(ADRs).

(neither is

There are two
involved in a

and one such firm in the

These are excluded from our study.

Two

other firms in the sample of HBs incorporate as public
companies

for less than one year before they bid for the

target in a hostile manner,

and annual executive

compensation data is accordingly not available.
thus 55 WKs

(of which 16 are HHW WKs)

There are

and 39 HBs remaining

in the sample.
Table 8

(on next page)

provides a distribution of the

types of reporting of executive stock options in proxy
statements by the different bidders.

No systematic

difference is observed in type of reporting between WKs and
HBs.

Additionally,

the panel relating to time distribution
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Table 8

Types of Reporting of Executive Stock Options
in Proxv Statements

DISTRIBUTION AMONG BIDDERS:

"WHITE KNIGHTS "
(N=55)

HOSTILE BIDDERS
(N =39)

TOTAL
(N=94)

TYPE I

20

15

35

TYPE II

14

11

25

TYPE III

7

5

12

TYPE IV

8

5

13

NO OPTIONS

6

3

9

TIME DISTRIBUTION:

1978-80

1981-84

1985-87

TOTAL
(N=94)

30

4

1

35

TYPE II

1

24

0

25

TYPE III

0

2

10

12

TYPE IV

0

1

12

13

NO OPTIONS

3

5

1

9

TYPE I
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clearly demonstrates that the type of reporting chosen by
the bidder is a function of time.
which the sample of bidders
prevails

In the time period over

is chosen,

Type I reporting

in the period 1978-1980.

Type II reporting is

dominant in the period 1981-1984.

The period 1985-1987

sees

the prevalence of type III and type IV reporting.
A further scrutiny of executive stock options reveals
that six WKs and three HBs have no executive stock options
outstanding.
otherwise,

No systematic pattern,

industry-based or

can be noted in such exclusion of executive stock

option plans.

For the purposes of our analysis,

the value

of outstanding stock options held by principal executive
officers

in these firms

is assumed to be zero.

firms with no executive stock options,

Aside from

the application of

the methodology for valuation yields positive dollar values
for the lower valuation bound of options outstanding for all
WKs and all but one HB.

For this one HB,

the value of the

lower bound of the option is negative due to an extremely
low stock price at the time of the contest.
the value of the option for this

In our analysis,

firm is assumed to be zero.

We first look at the descriptive statistics

observed variables,

as reported in Table 9

for the

(on next page).

The mean annual cash and cash-equivalent remuneration to
principal executive officers and their mean beneficial
ownership of stock is higher for WKs than for HBs.

The WK

firm also has more debt and a larger market value of common
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equity.

However,

the HB firms have their principal

executive officers holding a larger amount of outstanding
executive stock options than their counterparts

in the WK

firms.

Table 9.
Descriptive Statistics of Annual Cash and Cash-Equivalent
Remuneration of Managers, Beneficial Stock and Stock Option
Ownership bv Managers, Book Value of Firm Debt and Market
Value of Firm Equity for "White Knights*1 and Hostile Bidders
on a Date Immediately Preceding the Contest

($/million)

Managerial
Remuneration

Table 10

MEAN

MEAN

STANDARD
DEVIATION

3.30

2.35

121.61

486.32

69.34

129.97

5.37

7.44

9.49

18.64

827.24

1265.34

681.58

1170.20

2178.20

2808.47

1349.10

2882.10

(on next page)

these observed variables
(WKs and HBs).

STANDARD
DEVIATION

2.30

Managerial
Options holdings

Aggregate
Firm Equity

HOSTILE BIDDER
(N=39)

4.70

Managerial
Stockholdings

Aggregate
Firm Debt

"WHITE KNIGHT"
(N=55)

shows the correlation matrix of

for the entire sample of bidders

Cash and cash-equivalent remuneration is
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found to be positively correlated with market value
common equity
is

(r=0.6).

deemed to be

result

a proxy

reinforces

literature

If the market value

the

(described

for the

findings

size

of the

in the

in chapter

Table

2)

of

of

common equity

firm,

relevant

this

empirical

regarding the

strong

10.

Correlation Matrix of Annual Cash and Cash-Ecruivalent
Remuneration of Managers, Beneficial Stock and Stock Option
Ownership bv Managers, Book Value of Firm Debt and Market
Value of Firm Equity for “White Knights" and Hostile Bidders
on a Date Immediately Preceding the Contest

Remuneration!

1.00

Stock

0.07

1.0

Option

0.18

0.06

1.00

Debt

0.43

0.02

0.19

1.00

Equity

0.60

0.24

0.21

0.42

1.00

Option

Debt

Equity

-

Remuneration

empirical
and

relationship between executive

firm size,

hypotheses
5.2.2

Stock

and provides

strength to the premises

of

Difference

Between Groups

From the primary data

chapter
testable

COM,

3)

of

regarding managerial motivation.

Analysis

variables

cash compensation

OP and

DEQ

which enable us

terms.

collected,

are defined

(as

three key
explained

in

to generate the hypotheses

COM and OP are termed as
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the

in

INCENTIVE

our

VARIABLES

as

through the

they directly affect managerial
incentive

structure.

termed

since

managerial

indirectly through the

monitoring of managerial
COM can be
principal

firm,

intensity of the

expected annual

income

of

and

of part of the common equity of the
cash

remuneration.

income

from cash and

Higher values

imply a greater alignment with the

of

of the

utility and

Lower values

cash and cash-equivalent

COM will

interests

for maximization of managerial

firm-value maximizing behavior.
imply that

the

affect

from their direct

relative to their annual

stockholders

as

action by others.

officers

ownership

cash-equivalent
thus

expected to

interpreted as the

executive

beneficial

is

is

MONITORING VARIABLE
behavior

it

DEQ

behavior

of

COM can

remuneration

is

the

incentive primarily motivating the decision making by
managers,

making

size maximization dominate

firm-value

maximization.
OP can be
principal

interpreted as

executive

outstanding

officers

remuneration.

consequences
(i)

expected annual

from their holdings

(unexercised and unexpired)

relative to their annual
equivalent

the

in this

cash

income

valuation.12

of

stock options,

from cash and cash-

Stock options have two

context.

They are deferred compensation,
present value

income

is being used
The

ratio OP,
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whose discounted

for purposes
in

some

sense,

of
thus

of

measures the importance assigned by managers to
expected income in the near-term horizon as contrasted
with current cash income.
(ii)

The valuation of stock options

is positively

related to the riskiness of the stock.
will thus

indicate,

in some sense,

of risk aversion by managers.

the relative degree

A higher OP will

that managers are less risk averse,
take the normal business risks

The ratio OP

and are prepared to

in their decision-making

which are necessary for earning normal returns
firm.

On the other hand,

imply

for the

a lower value of OP may imply

a lower propensity on the part of managers to undertake
normal business risk.
greater extent,

They may thus be motivated,

to a

to diversify their own employment risk

through size maximization

(Amihud and Lev,

1981).

DEQ is a variation of the traditional debt equity
ratio,

and the mode of construction of the variable

deliberately excludes preferred stock for ease of
interpretation in the context of the study.
is a hybrid security,
implications

Preferred stock

and it may have some monitoring

for some firms and none for others.

value of debt is preferred to its market value,

The book
as

significant amounts of corporate debt in the sample are
privately placed.

The variable,

though not ideal

the preferred stock component of the capital
with its monitoring implications
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in that

structure along

is not considered,

and

market value is not used for corporate debt wherever
available,

is the best suited to fulfil our objectives

the context of the study.

A higher value of DEQ will

relatively larger holdings of debt,
flow available to managers.
monitoring of the managers'

and less

"free"

imply
cash

There will also be better
behavior,

which will act as a

disincentive for non-value maximizing behavior.13
contrast,

in

In

lower values of DEQ may enable managers to act

without any constraints,

for maximization of their own

utility.
We analyze the differences between the measures of
central tendency for the following pairs of groups,

to draw

inferences regarding the motivation of their managers.
(i)

WKs and HBs.

(ii)

HHW WKs and non-HHW WKs.

(iii) ASB WKs and non-ASB WKs.
(iv)

HHW WKs and HBs.

(v)

NON-HHW WKs and HBs.

Table 11

(on next page)

provides the results of the

t-tests and Wilcoxon tests for differences of the mean
values of COM,

OP and DEQ for the WKs and HBs.

DEQ are observed to be significantly higher,
our hypothesis.

Both OP and

as posited in

We are unable to establish a significant

difference for COM based on the parametric t-test,

though

the non-parametric Wilcoxon test does provide evidence to
this effect.

Thus,

on the average,
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HBs have significantly

Table 11.

T-Test and Wilcoxon Test for Differences Between Measures of
Central Tendency of Constructed Variables COM, OP, DEO and
MGR for the Two Groups: "White Knights” and Hostile Bidders

"WHITE KNIGHT"
(N==55)
MEAN

HOSTILE BIDDER
(N=39)

STAND.
DEV.

MEAN
^2

t-STATISTIC

WILCOXON
(Z)

STAND.
DEV.

COM

5.74

25.86

3.98

6.22

0.41

- 2.50**

OP

0.20

0.28

0.67

1.58

- 2.15**

-

DEQ

0.64

0.90

1.25

1.51

- 2.46**

- 2.13*

MGR

0.08

0.13

0.15

0.17

- 2.43**

_ _ _**
- 3.07

1.09

a=0.01.
a=0.10.

higher relative levels of debt in their capital structure,
and a relatively higher level of expected income from
outstanding stock and options compared to their cash income.
Table 12

(on next page)

t-tests and Wilcoxon tests
values of COM,

provides the results of the

for differences of the mean

OP and DEQ for the WKs under the HHW process

and the WKs under the non-HHW process.

We observe here that

COM is significantly higher

for the HHW WKs as

compared to the non-HHW WKs,

(at a=0.10)

which is a direct evidence of

the significantly lower incentive of HHW managers to engage
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Table 12.
T-Test and Wilcoxon Test for Differences Between Measures of
Central Tendency of Constructed Variables COM, OP. DEO and
MGR for the Two Groups: “White Knights11 Under the HHW Market
Process and "White Knights" Under the Non-HHW Market Process

HHW PROCESS
(N =16)

NON-HHW PROCESS
(N =39)

t-STATISTIC

WILCOXON
(Z)

MEAN

Mi

STAND.
DEV.

15.50

47.42

1.74

2.51

1.83*

1.84*

OP

0.27

0.40

0.17

0.22

1.26

0.41

DEQ

0.73

1.40

0.60

0.60

0.46

MGR

0.12

0.20

0.06

0.10

1.47

MEAN

COM

*

m2

STAND.
DEV.

-

1.07

1.03

a=0.10.

in ]non firm- value maximizing behavior as compared to the
managers of non-HHW WKs.14

We are unable to support our

hypotheses of significantly higher levels of OP and DEQ for
HHW WKs.
Table

13 below provides the results of the t-tests and

Wilcoxon tests

for differences of mean values of WKs under

the ASB market process and WKs under the non-ASB market
process.

No significant differences are observed in any of

the constructed variables,
stated in chapter 3)

which confirms our view

(as

that partitions based on bidding
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Table 13.
T-Test and Wilcoxon Test for Differences Between Measures of
Central Tendency of Constructed Variables COM. OP. DEO and
MGR for the Two Groups: "White Knights” Under the ASB Market
Process and "White Knicrhts" Under the Non-ASB Market Process

ASB PROCESS
(N=9)

NON-ASB PROCESS
(N==46)

t-STATISTIC

WILCOXON
(Z)

MEAN

Mi

STAND
DEV.

COM

1.40

2.44

6.59

28.23

- 0.55

- 1.22

OP

0.14

0.09

0.21

0.30

- 0.73

0.35

DEQ

0.45

0.35

0.68

0.97

- 0.68

- 0.32

MGR

0.03

0.04

0.09

0.15

- 1.05

- 0.27

MEAN

m2

STAND.
DEV.

behavior after the first bids cannot be predicated on
divergent incentive related motives of managers.
Table 14

(on next page)

and Table 15

(on page

133)

list

results which provide strong indirect empirical evidence for
our principal construct.

From Table 14,

of the constructed variables COM,

OP,

we observe that none

and DEQ are different

across the two groups of HHW WKs and HBs,15

implying the

likelihood of similar manager motivations across these two
groups.

From Table 15,

we observe that all the constructed

variables are significantly higher for the HBs as contrasted
to the group of non-HHW WKs.

Thus,

manager motivations are

likely to be different for HBs and non-HHW WKs and similar
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Table 14.
T-Test and Wilcoxon Test for Differences Between Measures of
Central Tendency of Constructed Variables COM, OP, DEO and
MGR for the Two Groups: “White Knights” Under the HHW Market
Process and Hostile Bidders

"WHITE KNIGHT"
HHW PROCESS
(N =16)

HOSTILE BIDDER

t -STATISTIC

(N=39)

WILCOXON
(Z)

(MrM2)

STAND.
DEV.

MEAN

Mi

STAND.
DEV.

15.50

47.42

3.98

6.22

1.51

- 0.44

OP

0.27

0.40

0.67

1.58

- 0.98

- 0.44

DEQ

0.73

1.40

1.25

1.51

-

-

MGR

0.12

0.20

0.15

0.17

- 0.67

MEAN

COM

★

1.19

1.97*

- 1.34

a=0.10.

for HBs and HHW WKs.
in a

m2

If we assume that managers of HBs act

firm value maximizing manner,

then by implication,

managers of HHW WKs will have similar incentives to act in a
firm value maximizing manner and managers of non-HHW firms
will

likely act in a non value maximizing manner.
In terms of the hypotheses listed in Chapter 3

62-67),

the results

in Tables 11-13

support for hypotheses 1,

2,

3,

4,

evidence empirical
& 7.

establish the validity of hypotheses 5
in Table 12,

though the results

We are unable to
&

in Tables

6

from the results
14

&

15 do provide

an indirect indication of their appropriateness.
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Table 15.
T-Test and Wilcoxon Test for Differences Between Measures of
Central Tendency of Constructed Variables COM, OP. DEO and
MGR for the Two Groups: "White Knights” Under the Non-HHW
Process and Hostile Bidders

“WHITE KNIGHT"
HOSTILE BIDDER
NON-HHW PROCESS
(N==39)
(N =39)

t-STATISTIC

WILCOXON
(Z)

MEAN

STAND.
DEV.

MEAN

STAND.
DEV.

COM

1.74

2.51

3.98

6.22

- 2.09**

-

OP

0.17

0.22

0.67

1.58

-

1.94*

- 1.18

DEQ

0.60

0.60

1.25

1.51

-

2.48**

-

MGR

0.06

0.10

0.15

0.17

- 2.97**

**
*

5.2. 3

3.02**

1.70*

_

_

— 3.26

a=0.01.
a=0.10.

Cross-sectional Relationships
We next endeavor to explain the variation in market

reaction to bids by the bidding firms
day CARs)

(measured by the two

due to variations in the managerial

monitoring disincentive variables COM,
(on next page)

incentive and

OP and DEQ.

Table 16

reports the results of testing the

explanatory variables

for multicollinearity.

It can be seen

from the table that the three independent variables are not
correlated with one another.

The auxilliary regressions
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Table 16.
Detection of Multicollinearity;
Correlation Matrix of Constructed Variables COM, OP, DEO;
and Auxiliary Regressions with Each of the Variables COM,
OP, DEO as the Dependent Variable and the Other Two as
Explanatory Variables

CORRELATION MATRIX
COM

1.00

OP

0.04

1.00

DEQ

- 0.08

0.00

1.00

MGR

0.40

- 0.04

0.14

1.00

DEQ

MGR

OP

COM

AUXILIARY REGRESSIONS

COM

OP
DEQ

0.40

2.

OP

COM
DEQ

0.08

-0.02

0.002
0.004

0.4
0.04

3.

DEQ

OP
DEQ

0.31

-0.005
0.005

-0.78
0.04

•

•

1.

o
N)

t
ESTIMATED
COEFFICIENT

l
o

o
H

R2

-(2,91)

l
o

DEPENDENT EXPLANATORY
VARIABLE
VARIABLE

0.8
-1.4

0.4
-0.8

reveal that any two of the variables together are not
correlated with the third explanatory variable.
Table 17

(on next page)

reports the results of the Chow

test for structural differences between the HHW WKs,
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the

Table 17.
Chow Test for Structural Differences Between the Three
Groups of Bidding Firms viz. Hostile Bidders. "White
Knights” Under the HHW Process, and "White Knights" Under
the Non-HHW Process, in Explaining the Two Day CAR Ending on
the Date of the Bid Through the Constructed Explanatory
Variables COM. OP. DEO

MODEL:

CAR = a + B^COM + B2*OP + B3*DEQ + €

UNRESTRICTED MODEL:
Sum of squared residuals:
hostile bidders

= 0.072047

"white knights" under HHW process

= 0.024121

"white knights" under non-HHW process= 0.048321
Unrestricted sum of squares

= 0.144489

RESTRICTED MODEL:
Sum of squared residuals

F(8,90)

2.14

= 0.174770

*

a=0.05.

non-HHW WKs and the HBs in explaining the variation in two
day CARs through the constructed managerial incentive and
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Table

18.

Multiple Regression to Evaluate the Impact of the
Constructed Variables COM, OP AND DEO for all Bidders, and
the Differential Impact of "White Knights” Under the
HHW
Process and the "White Knights” Under the Non-HHW Process.
on the Two Day CAR Ending on the Date of the Bid

Explanatory variables:
DUM1

=1,
= 0

if bidder is
otherwise.

"white knight"

DUM2 =1,
= 0

if bidder is
otherwise.

the

COM,

OP,

under HHW process.

first hostile bidder.

DEQ.

Dependent variable:
CAR

= two day market adjusted mean cumulative abnormal
return for the bidding firm ending on the date of
its

first bid.

MODEL:

CAR = a +

a1*DUM1

VARIABLE
CONSTANT

+

a2*DUM2 +

COEFFICIENT
ESTIMATOR
a

DUM1

ai

dum2

a2

COM

b1

OP

b2

DEQ

b3

Adjusted R2 =
F(5f88)=

B^COM +

VALUE
0.0458

B2*OP + B3*DEQ +

t-STATISTIC
-

6.40**

0.0278

2.20**

0.0326

3.20

0.0001

0.55

0.0181

4.23

0.0017

0.45

0.27

8.032**

a=0.01.
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**

**

e

monitoring disincentive variables.

From the Chow test,

the

null hypothesis of no difference between the three groups
rejected.

We accordingly construct two dummy variables to

represent the HHW WK and the HB.
Table 18

is

The model

is specified in

(on previous page).

From Table 18,

we note that the regression has a

significant F-statistic,

implying that the null hypothesis

of all the coefficients being zero is rejected.
significant negative intercept,

There is a

implying that the non-HHW WK

will have a negative two day CAR.

This negative CAR will be

significantly reduced if the bidder is the WK under the HHW
market process,

or if it is the first HB bid.

Once again,

the HHW WKs and HBs seem to affect the dependent variable in
a similar manner,

significantly different from the 2

for the non-HHW WK.16

The coefficient of the constructed

variable OP is positive and significant,
coefficients
This

day CAR

while the

for COM and DEQ are positive and insignificant.

implies that the market perceives managers to be

perhaps motivated more by incentives related to the near
term future horizon
the present
this

(COM),

(OP)

than by the incentive situation in

or monitoring disincentives

(DEQ),

is reflected in a significantly higher positive

lower negative)

CAR with an increase in OP.

and
(or

The significant

relationship between OP and CAR also shows that in the
absence of relatively high stock option holdings
managers,

as exists

for WKs

(from table 11),
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by

the market

might perceive an acquisition attempt by the late bidder as
an effort to diversify the employment risk of managers,
thus react more negatively to such a move.
higher value of OP,

as exists

A relatively

for HBs and HHW WKs,

reduce the propensity of managers

and

will

for diversifying

employment risk through firm enlargement and encourage risk
taking for firm value maximization.
The model as described in Table 18
heteroskedasticity using White's test.
test statistic of 17.84

is

investigated for

The test yields a

for 26 degrees of freedom.

A

comparison with the chi-square distribution fails to reject
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.
Summarizing,

the T-tests reveal

similarities

in

constructed variables between the HHW WKs and the HBs,
differences

and

in constructed variables between HHW WKs and HBs

on the one hand and non-HHW WKs on the other.

The variable

COM is significantly higher for the HHW WKs as compared to
the non-HHW WKs.

The Chow test and the results of the

regression reinforce the view that the classification of
bidders

into HBs,

HHW WKs and non-HHW WKs

is valid as

it

differentially explains the two day CAR ending on the date
of the first bid.

The variable OP is observed to

significantly explain the variation in CAR.

Though the

signs of the coefficients COM and DEQ are positive as
expected,

they are not found to be significant in explaining

the two day CAR ending on the date of the first bid.
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ENDNOTES

1.

There are eight instances of preemptive acquirers of
targets expecting to be in play, of which only three
are public companies. In all these cases, the acquirers
are successful in acquiring targets. CARs during the
preemptive offer are found to be positive in all cases,
in conformity with the CAR profile observed for
friendly acquisitions.

2.

Two of the contests are actually four party contests,
with two HBs in each case.
In the first case, the
first HB is an OTC firm, and is hence excluded from the
analysis. In the second case, the second HB is not
considered in the analysis.
However, the WKs in both
the instances are treated as HHW WKs in terms of the
definition in Chapter 3.

3.

Of the 62 WKs in the sample, 52 firms are successful in
acquiring the respective target firm.
In ten contests,
the WK fails to prevail. In four of these contests, the
HB prevails by overbidding the WK.
In the other six
contests, the target is finally acquired by a third
bidder (which is another WK in two of these contests).
It is noteworthy that once the target is in play, it
ultimately ceases to exist as an independent entity in
all the 62 contests, irrespective of the success or
failure of the first WK in its acquisition efforts.

4.

For the WKs which fail to prevail, events beyond the
date of withdrawal of the WK are not considered in the
study, since the participation of the WK determines the
span of interest in the contests studied.
In these
situations, D3 indicates the subsequent bid by the
hostile bidder, and D4 indicates withdrawal by the WK.
In instances where the unsuccessful WK withdrew before
the subsequent sequential bid of the first bidder, D3
and D4 are defined to coincide on the date of
withdrawal of the WK from the contest.
Thus, by
construction, D3 is designed either to precede or to
coincide with D4.
For the successful WKs, the actual
acquisition is completed on D4, though the outcome of
the auction is public knowledge on D3.

5.

(D2+1,D1') represents the interval between each
sequence WH, and (D1,,+1,D2') represents the interval
between each subsequent sequence HW after the first HW.
(D2,,+1,D3) represents the interval between the last WK
bid and HB withdrawal.
These intervals are thus
related through the identity:
(D2+l, D3) = (D2+l, D1 ■ ■) + (D, • *+l, D2') + (D2"+1, D3)
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.

6

English auctions assume that the value of the item
being sold does not change during the duration of the
auction.
The short length of the auction process
relative to the length of the control contest makes it
less likely that the value of the target firm will
change significantly during the auction period.

7.

If the WK bid signals poor management abilities, and
the antitakeover strategy fails owing to the inability
of the WK to prevail and acquire the target, then the
WK could likely become the target of future bids by
others.
A case in point is Gulf Oil Corp., which lost
approx. 1 billion dollars in equity value over two days
when it announced that it was going to be the WK in the
takeover defense of Cities Service against the hostile
bid of Mesa Petroleum in June, 1982.
That acquisition
fell through on anti-trust grounds.
In February 1984,
Gulf Oil Corp. was itself the target of a hostile
takeover bid by Mesa Petroleum, and was acquired by a
WK, Standard Oil Co. of California (Chevron).

8.

In fact, there is only one instance where the CAR for
(D2-l, D2) was positive and significant.
The event
occurred in 1987 when Dow Chemical Corp. was the WK
acquiring La Maur Inc. against the hostile bid of
Alberto-Culver Co.

9.

While the HB sample is not representative of all
hostile bidders, since it is a secondary sample derived
from the WK sample, the returns pattern here is
observed to conform more to the earlier work on bidder
returns, reviewed in Jensen and Ruback (1983), than to
the more recent work reviewed in Black (1989).

10.

We are aware of the small size of the HHW sub-sample
(and the ASB sub-sample discussed in section 5.1.6) and
its consequences for hypothesis testing.
Yet, we feel
confident regarding our inferences, based on the
magnitude of the relative CARs and the absence of
inconsistencies in our results.

11.

This percentage is comparable to the 60% negative
CARs among HBs for the two days prior to their first
bid at D1.

12.

The deferment is only for a short term, as opposed to
other longer term contingent forms of remuneration like
retirement benefits.

13.

With higher values of DEQ, managers will be operating
under a high financial risk.
They might have a
propensity to undertake suboptimal investments such as
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risky-asset substitution on behalf of their
stockholders, since the stockholders would loose
relatively little in the event of default on debt.
Here, the managers are acting in the best interests of
the stockholders; yet agency conflict between
stockholders and bondholders can cause reduction in the
value of the firm.
Bondholders are aware of this
possibility, and employ monitoring mechanisms to
prevent its occurrence.
(See, Myers, 1977; Smith and
Warner, 1979).
14.

It may be noted that the variable MGR defined in
chapter 3 is unable to discriminate between the HHW WKs
and the non-HHW WKs.

15.

The Wilcoxon test shows that the DEQ for the hostile
bidders is significantly higher than the DEQ for "White
Knights" under the HHW process.
This result, along
with the subsequent result in Table 15 that the DEQ for
hostile bidders is significantly higher than the DEQ
for "White Knights" under the non-HHW process, seems to
indicate that hostile bidders generally have higher
relative levels of debt as compared to "White Knights".
This implies a greater probability of outside
monitoring of managerial actions for hostile bidders,
and a corresponding disincentive for these managers to
make bids that may be construed as non firm value
maximizing.

16.

The regression is also run by creating dummies for HHW
and non-HHW WKs. While the dummy for the non-HHW WK has
a significant coefficient to demonstrate its difference
from the HB, the dummy for the HHW WK has a coefficient
that is not significant, implying the inability of the
regression to distinguish between HHW WK and HB in
explaining two day CARs.
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CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Summary of Findings of the Study
The results obtained in this dissertation show that not
all WK acquisitions are wealth reducing transactions.

The

negative perception of the market toward the WK seems to be
a function of the sequence of bidding in the contest,

and is

considerably more ambivalent under the HHW market process
where the WK bid follows two successive bids by the same HB.
The market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return for the
HHW WKs over the entire period of the contest is not
significant.

On the other hand,

empirical evidence shows

that the non-HHW WK bids have a greater likelihood of being
wealth reducing.

In the ASB market process where the WK

engages in sequential bidding with the HB after its first
bid,

each successive bid of the WK is observed to be a

wealth reducing transaction.
The overall behavior of the WKs,

though significantly

different from the control group of HBs,
homogeneous.

is certainly not

The wealth reduction involved when the HHW WKs

make their bid does seem to be at variance with the wealth
increasing bids of the control group of HBs.

Yet,

the

extent of wealth reduction for these WKs during their bid is
significantly less than that of non-HHW WKs during the bid,
and as a further contrast,
control contest.

insignificant over the entire

This pattern for HHW WKs is thus more in

conformity with the distribution of bidder returns as
observed in recent studies and summarized in Black (1989).
It is possible that the varying investor reaction to the
bids of the HHW WKs, when compared to the bids of the HBs is
a consequence of the subsequent nature of WK bids.
contrast,
WKs,

the negative market reaction to bids by non-HHW

which is much more pervasive,

magnitudes,
contest,

In

large in economic

and increasing in size over the length of the

is more likely t be ascribable to manager

motivations leading to a possible divergence from the goal
of firm value maximization.
Empirical analysis of market data on WKs thus prompt us
to investigate the market process based segmentation of WKs
into HHW WKs and non-HHW WKs as a reflection of the manager
motivations involved in making the bids.

Perhaps,

the

managers of HHW WKs desire to act in a firm value maximizing
manner,

but being subsequent bidders,

with hubris or the winner's curse.
even have wealth increasing bids,
in eliminating the winner's curse.

are just afflicted

Several of these WKs
indicating their success
In comparison,

the

widespread and economically larger wealth reducing actions
of the managers of the non-HHW WKs seem to be planned in
advance,

perhaps because of the availability of free cash

flow and/or an urge to maximize growth of their firm.
In Chapter 1, we suggest that overpayments by bidding
firms may occur because of two reasons:
(i)

firm-value maximizing behavior by managers,

and hubris

or "winner's curse" arising out of the bidding process
in acquisitions.
(ii)

non firm-value maximizing behavior by managers due to
incentive misalignment resulting in agency conflicts
with stockholders,

or availability of "free" cash flow

encouraging size maximization through acquisitions.
We further submit that for WKs, whether the
overpayments are due to

(i)

or

(ii)

above will depend on the

position of the WK in the bidding queue.
the bidding after two bids by the HB
process),

If the WK enters

(an HHW market

it is likely that they have made their bid on the

basis of more information
second bid of the HB).

(including that contained in the

They will also likely have appraised

the target more thoroughly,

as proxied by a greater length

of time between their bid and the preceding bid of the HB.
This results in the observed negative CAR during their bid
and the proportion of negative CARs in their portfolio being
considerably smaller than that for WKs under the non-HHW
market process.

The overpayments,

being small, may be

ascribed to hubris or the winner's curse in the context of
the firm wealth maximizing intentions of the managers.

An

implication of this result is the absence of any intrinsic
difference between the managerial objectives of HHW WKs and
HBs in maximizing the value of the firm.
Much stronger negative market reactions to WKs
participating in the non-HHW market processes indicate the
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market's apprehension of non-firm value maximizing behavior
by the managers of these WKs.
view in this regard is

Our estimate of the market's

further supported when examining the

subsequent bidding behavior of HBs and WKs in ASB market
processes,

which are a subset of the non-HHW market process.

Subsequent bids by HBs under the ASB market process do not
elicit any negative market response,

since HB managers are

assumed to be firm-value maximizing.

However,

each

subsequent bid by the ASB WKs is always met with a strong
negative market reaction,

implying that these managers may

not be maximizing firm value through their proposed
acquisition.

Since practically all the ASB WKs are non-HHW

WKs as well,

it is feasible that managers of non-HHW WKs in

general have intrinsically different goals relative to the
managers of HHW WKs and HBs,

leading to non firm value

maximizing behavior.
We feel that on an ex-ante basis,

managerial motivation

for firm-value maximization can be evaluated by measuring
the direct incentive effects associated with the proportion
of stock and stock options in the compensation structure of
managers.

However,

from existing econometric evidence

(detailed in Chapter 2),

the proportion of cash income in

the compensation is an incentive for growth or size
maximization.

An appropriate ratio of these two factors in

the compensation may thus enable us to evaluate,
comparative basis,

on a

the relative impact on managerial
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behavior of the incentives
size maximization.

for firm value maximization and

In addition,

external monitoring of

manager compliance with the goal of firm-value maximization
can limit deviations due to agency conflicts.

It may be

noted in this regard that despite its obvious advantages in
eliminating agency conflicts,

it is not possible to pay

managers their entire compensation in the form of stock and
stock options,
(1990)

for reasons mentioned in Jensen and Murphy

and summarized in Chapter 2.

Accordingly,

we

construct two incentive variables and one monitoring
variable to incorporate the divergent incentive implications
of stock/stock options and cash income,
effectiveness of monitoring.

The incentive variables are

the income equivalent of managerial
the

and consider the

stockholding

(COM)

and

income equivalent of managerial holding of executive

stock options

(OP),

both relative to the annual cash and

cash-equivalent income of the managers.

The monitoring

variable is the level of firm debt

relative to the

market value of firm equity.

(DEQ)

From the investor reaction to

bidding behavior reviewed earlier,

we would expect COM,

OP

and DEQ for the firm value maximizing HBs and HHW WKs to be
higher,

because of the relatively greater proportion of

stock and stock options directing the incentives toward firm
value maximizing behavior,

and the effectiveness of

monitoring in these situations.
COM,

On the contrary,

values of

OP and DEQ are likely to be lower for non-HHW WKs
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because of the relatively greater role of cash income in
channelizing incentives toward growth or size maximizing
behavior.

The results of our analysis are summarized below

(where the subscripts
variable belongs,

indicate the group to which the

and the notation « indicates the

inability

of the tests to distinguish between the two groups):

Incentive Variables
COM
^^HHU

comhb

>

>

1

OP
0PHHW

COMN0N-HHW

COMnqn-hhw

~

OP
WiNON-HHU

> OP
wrNON-HHU

0PHB

comhhu

*

comhb

0PHHW

comasb

«

COMnon-asb

®PASB

“

0PHB

~

OP
wrNON-ASB

i

According to the Wilcoxon test,

0PHB «

°pnon-hhu

Monitoring Variable
DEQ
DEQhhw

DEQhb

~

>

deqnon -HHW

deQnon-hhu

deQhhw ~ DEQHB

DEQasb « DEQnon -ASB

According to the Wilcoxon test,
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DEQHB > DEQHHW.

The above results provide direct evidence that
differences
of bidding
contests

in WKs based on their position in the sequence
(upto their first bid)

in corporate control

indeed reflect the varying incentives motivating

the managers.

While such incentive alignments are not

readily observable,

varying investor reaction to the bids by

the two categories of WKs indicates the market's
differential perception of the objectives of the respective
managers.

This

the Chow test,

is additionally confirmed by the results of
which show that there are structural

differences between the non-HHW WKs and the HHW WKs
HBs)

(and the

in explaining the two day CAR ending on the date of the

first bid.

The use of dummies by two of the groups

in a

regression shows that the market perception of bids by HHW
WKs and HBs

is statistically indistinguishable.

the reaction to bids by non-HHW WKs

However,

is significantly more

negative.
We can thus conclude that based on the significantly
higher value for the incentive variable COM for HHW WKs
relative to non-HHW WKs,

the significantly higher values for

all the incentive and monitoring variables of HBs as
compared to non-HHW WKs,

and the inability of the tests to

find any difference between these variables
HBs,

for HHW WKs and

managers of HBs and HHW WKs are more likely to be firm-

value maximizers.

Negative market reactions to their bids,

as observed from time to time for a large section of these
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firms,

could reasonably be ascribed to affliction with

hubris or the

"winner's curse".

lower values of COM,

However,

the significantly

OP and DEQ for non-HHW WKs

indicate

that their managers are less likely to be firm value
maximizers.

The preponderance of negative market reaction

to their bids

implies that non firm value maximizing

hypotheses like size maximization or "free"
motivating the bids of these non-HHW WKs.
is clear from the results that the

cash flow may be
Incidentally,

it

incentive alignments of

the managers are reflected only in their first bid.
Subsequent bids by the WK

(captured by the ASB process)

presumably follow the same managerial motivations and can
therefore not be distinguished through the defined variables
COM,

OP and DEQ.

6.2

Further Implications
The results obtained for the variable COM are directly

consistent across the three groups of HBs,
HHW WKs,

HHW WKs and non-

and are supported by both the parametric and non-

parametric tests.

However,

the inferences regarding the

ability of OP and DEQ to differentiate between the relative
groups are weaker,
In particular,
and DEQ,

being not inconsistent across the groups.

our theory requires that for the variables OP

the relevant statistical test provide evidence of a

significant difference between the measure of central
tendency for the HHW and non-HHW WKs.

However,

the tests,

which are structured on the null hypothesis of equality
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among groups,

are observed not to be powerful enough to

reject the null at the required level of confidence.
addition,

In

the parametric and non-parametric tests do not

yield identical results for these variables.
based our general

While we have

inferences regarding OP and DEQ on the

results of the t-test between pairs of groups,

the lack of

support from the Wilcoxon test does make the evidence
weaker.
some

However,

the non-parametric results also provide

interesting insights regarding these variables.
In respect of the variable OP,

the inability of the

Wilcoxon test to distinguish between HBs and non-HHW WKs may
additionally provide weak evidence that OP is not different
for any of the three groups.

If OP is considered to be a

proxy for the business risk propensity of managers,
is possible to envisage that apriori,

then it

the distribution of

risk aversion is not significantly different across the
three groups of HHW WKs,

non-HHW WKs and HBs.

However,

in

preference to the variable COM which reflects the existing
managerial

incentives,

acquisition bid

the market seems to price the

(through the two day CARs)

on the expected

incentive alignments of managers in the near term future
(through the variable OP).

This can be said to indicate the

market's view that current managerial behavior is more
likely to be governed by the incentive expectations of the
managers

in the near-term horizon.
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The significant impact of OP on CAR is
the separate,

significant impact on CAR of dummy variables

representing the three groups of HHW WKs,
HBs.

in addition to

The variable COM is a reflection,

variable OP in the past,
options by managers.

non-HHW WKs and

in part,

of the

through the exercise of stock

To this extent,

its

influence on

managerial action is likely to have been directly priced by
the market in the past on a prospective basis,

and firms

categorized at the prevailing time as value maximizers or
otherwise based on their incentive configurations.
market

is thus likely to be somewhat aware during the bid,

from past information on OP values,
the

The

firm belongs.

This additional

of the group to which
information causes the

market to discriminate against the non-HHW WK through a
negative CAR,

in addition to the current linear impact of OP

on CAR.
Summarizing,

the market apriori reacts negatively to

the bid by the group of non-HHW WKs,

which can be

distinguished from the other groups by a significantly
smaller value of the variable COM.

Additionally,

managers

with a higher value of OP during their bid are considered by
the market to be motivated to undertake normal business risk
for direct executive stock option benefits
horizon.

in the near-term

The acquisition activity of these managers

is

viewed by the market more positively since it is considered
to be

firm value maximizing.

Managers with a low value of OP
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are not likely to have the same incentive alignment for
taking normal business risk and maximizing their near-term
utility.

For them,

the investors may evaluate acquisition

activity as an effort to diversify employment risk,
a strong negative market reaction,

causing

since the action

accentuates agency conflicts.
For the monitoring effectiveness variable DEQ,

the

Wilcoxon test indicates that the variable has a lower value
for both HHW WKs and non-HHW WKs relative to HBs.
there is little doubt that the high DEQ for HBs

While

is an

indication of monitoring effectiveness for value maximizing
behavior,

it is also feasible that lower monitoring makes it

somewhat easier for WKs to come in with subsequent bids in
relative haste.

Thus,

while monitoring may not play a

direct role in distinguishing between the HHW WKs and nonHHW WKs,

ex-ante managerial

incentives,

the HHW WKs to be more like HBs.

in themselves,

cause

We do not find evidence

that the market directly prices effectiveness of monitoring
through a significant impact on the two day CAR,

though the

sign is positive as expected.
6.3

Contribution of the Study
We feel that the dissertation makes a number of

important contributions to the existing body of knowledge in
the

fields of mergers and acquisitions,

compensation structures.

agency theory,

and

It is the first study to

simultaneously assess the impact of two bidders
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in the same

contest

for control of a target's assets when one is hostile

and the other is

friendly.

friendly bidders

in these hostile takeover contests,

"white knights"

(WKs),

For the set of late entry
called

the study is again the first to

establish the differential nature of WK behavior based on
their position in the bidding queue.
is

In general,

the HB bid

followed by a WK bid leading to a WK acquisition of the

target firm.

However,

one group of WKs

follow a different market process,
process,

is observed to

called the HHW market

in as much as it enters the bidding only after the

hostile bidder has made a second higher bid for the target
firm on rejection of its

first bid.

bids by this category of bidders

The market reaction to

is radically different from

the market reaction to the complementary set of WKs.
group of WKs

Another

is observed to follow a market process called

the ASB market process where the HB and the WK alternate in
bidding with successively higher bids till the WK wins the
contest.

The market reaction here is an accumulation of the

reaction to single WK bids.

Thus,

we can make a partition

of the sample of bidders in corporate control contests
involving two or more bidders,

with each bidder having a

different approach to the acquisition of the same target
firm,

based on

(i)

the

inclination of the bidder,

(ii)

the timing and sequence of bidding by the hostile and
friendly bidders

i.e.

hostile or friendly

in the acquisition process.
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Our hypothesized market reactions
categories of bidders,
theory,

for these different

based on insights

from auction

is supported by the empirical evidence.

This enables

us to make inferences regarding the possible firm value
maximizing motivation of the managers of the WK firms.
The design of the study provides an added benefit in
that there is an inherent control

in the form of the HB bid

with which the different categories of WK bids can be
compared.

Subsequent HB bids can also be compared with

subsequent WK bids under the ASB market process.

In the

absence of any systematic size or industry based biases in
the selection of the hostile bidder and the WK,
the HB as the control

the use of

is effective and appropriate in

distinguishing market reaction to bids based on the status
of the bidder

(friendly or hostile)

and the sequence of

bidding.
Investor response to bidding behavior shows that there
is a significant difference in reactions depending upon who
makes the bid,

the HB or the WK.

When the WK makes the bid,

the reaction to the HHW WK differs
non-HHW WK.
negative,

Overall,

from the reaction to the

the response to WK bids

is strongly

indicating that managers of some WKs may not

always be acting in the best interests of the stockholders.
The response to the bids by HHW WKs

is weakly negative,

in conformity with the response to bids by HBs,

more

leading us

to believe that the point of entry of the WK in the bidding
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process

(HHW or non-HHW)

may indeed be the critical

factor

discriminating between WK manager motivations.
We believe that in the first instance,

manager

motivations to maximize stockholder wealth will be governed
by the

incentive alignments

in their compensation packages,

to reduce the potential agency conflict between the
stockholders
addition,

(principals)

and their agents

a disincentive to managers

(managers).

In

from engaging in

activity where there could be a potential conflict of
interest with the stockholders,
their activity,
Thus,

can come

from monitoring of

which increases with the existence of debt.

the creation of incentives

for managers to engage in

maximization of firm value originates

from the stockholders,

and the effectiveness of monitoring to discourage managers
from deviating from the goal of firm-value maximization
usually originates

from the bondholders through bond

covenants.
In its success

in defining and measuring these

incentive and monitoring variables through appropriate
proxies,

and showing how these proxy variables are

significantly different for the different groups of WKs and
HBs based on bidding behavior,
literature on agency theory.
knowledge,
into a

this study contributes to the

For the first time,

to our

compensation structures of managers are divided

firm value maximizing incentive component

(the income

equivalent of direct and beneficial ownership of stock and
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stock options by managers)
component,

and the

and a

size-maximizing cash

ratio of the two considered to be the

appropriate measure of the

incentive

Stock options

separately as

additionally

examined

incorporates

in managerial
by a variant

activity.

incentive

WKs

and HBs,

indicates

of these

stock and

The

employment

of the

firm stock

study thus

structure

of the manager.

compensation
size

reasons

to

consistent

managers

increase

of

size

lower proportion of

cash and cash-equivalent

In

addition,

incentives
the

of the

which motivates

little

the

cash

him/her to

incentive to maximize

considered.

The

ratios

incorporate both these

of the bid.

executive

This

firm

defined by
effects.
stock options

CAR

in the

ratio

can be

propensity to take normal
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incentive

analysis,

relationship with the

the time

to measure managerial

aspect

complete

ratio pertaining to

strong positive
at

establish that managerial

only one
For a

and provides

needs to be

to measure

market model

is

of the manager,

us

a

for HHW

in their compensation packages.

results

also

is proxied

overpayment by

contrary,

incentives

relative to

of

value,

On the

involved

find evidence that

are higher

risk due to the

ownership

increase

We

firms may be due to

stock options

compensation

riskiness

that possible

firms have greater

and diversify

their valuation

Monitoring effectiveness

firm value maximization.

non-HHW WK

extent of

and monitoring variables
which

the managers

has

the

of the debt-equity ratio.

the

with

are

alignment of managers.

said

business

risk

for

firm value maximization.

Firms whose managers may

prefer to diversify their employment
maximization,

since there

assuming normal
stock options,
negative

excess

managers

is

business

We
based

directly

our

Thus,

the

incentive

study the

impact

involved

of

of

compensation/beneficial
from the proxy
Avenues

and

this

approach

incentives

as

on the

conceptually broad

control

inferences

necessary to

ownership data

statements,

of

in acquisition decisions.

in corporate

approximations

larger

structure

studying the behavior of

firms

for

activity observed

In a broader context,

research results

limited by the

incentive

lower holding of

consider the dissertation to be

collaborative bidding

6.4

less

linked to managerial

of managers

for the purpose

However,

risk owing to

returns.

it possible to

activities

relatively

size

are penalized by the market through

in bidding behavior.
makes

is

risk through

detailed

late

entry

contests.

therefrom are

standardize the

on managers
in Chapter

available
4.

for Further Research

A number of

additional

hypotheses

can be generated and

tested relating to the partitioning based on timing and
sequence

of the WK bid.

preceding bids

is

A study of premiums

likely to

premium offered by HHW WKs
compared to
process,
for the

non-HHW WKs.

these premiums

reveal

a

significantly

over the preceding bid,
In the context

than
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for the

lower
as

of the ASB market

over preceding bids

subsequent WK bids

offered over

should be higher

subsequent HB bids.

A study

of the

cash and

likely establish
and HB bids.
also be

a

lower proportion of cash

However,

is

the

in WK bids may

also

A larger share

indicate the use

antitakeover device by these WKs,

become

in HHW WK bids

the method of payment

first bidder.

non-HHW WK bids will
an

of each bid will

influenced by the method of payment offered by the

HB which

as

stock components

less

susceptible

attractive

to

as takeover targets

of cash

of the

in

strategy

enable them to
and hence

less

to the disciplining mechanism of hostile

takeovers.
Three

avenues have been

preventing managers

The managerial
penalize

non

reduction
(ii)

researchers

from pursuing objectives

firm value maximization
(i)

identified by

(see

chapter

labor market,

Direct provision of

from

efficient,

will

3):

which,

if

through a

intrinsic value.
suitable

incentives

their compensation packages to motivate
maximizing

divergent

firm value maximizing managers

in their

as

to managers

in

actions

firm value.

(iii) Monitoring mechanisms

as

direct disincentives

to non

firm value maximizing behavior by managers:
(a)

Internal monitoring,

arising out

of the

existence

of bond covenants.
(b)

External monitoring,

through the disciplining

mechanism of the hostile takeover.
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With

regard to

(i)

labor market has

above,

the

efficiency of the managerial

not been established.

difficult to price human capital
in human

capital.

sequitur,
the

as

So,

of

to motivate managers
actions.
will
the

A

actions

indicate the

control

dollar gains

above

is

can be

firm less

contests

consequences

viz.

we have

as

context

significant dollar
its

possible gains
inferences

shown

strategies

in bids
of

by non-HHW WKs
[iii(b)],

interpreted as

as

an

attractive

as

a

target.

involving WKs provide

of

firms

such transfers.

the bidders

no doubt that

and

a non-

firm value maximizing

effectiveness

in equity values

limited

hostile

[iii(a)]

is

of
a

and the

targets,

for both categories.

control

contexts

Existing

An estimate

of

and noted
However,

incur

such dollar

comparison with dollar gains
by hostile bidders,

into

involving WKs,

large number of WKs

losses.

an

and the

on wealth transfers have divided contestants

categories,

losses,

labor market

study value transfers between

economic welfare

there

extremely

evade the disciplining mechanism of the hostile

opportunity to

in the

also

our study,

of cash

of these managers

Corporate

two

In

to undertake

takeover by making their

studies

and

larger proportion

indirectly

attempt to

the managerial

(ii)

is

and measure value changes

a practical matter.

effectiveness

It

by targets

can yield

interesting

regarding value transfers between

contestants

takeover bids

involving
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"white knights".

and

in

Finally,
agency

this

relationships between the managers

of the HHW WKs,
WKs

dissertation highlights

are

non-HHW WKs

said to be

equivalent

of

incentives

hand,

the

of managers

dominated by cash compensation.
dissertation

is

that

acquisition activity,
ex-ante

incentive

compensation
should

undertaken,
Thus,

actions
are

ex-post,

for the

of non-HHW WKs
A principal

likely to be

a

income

other

are

premise

of the

including

the

relative

influencing managerial
after the

in

reflection of their

Accordingly,

non-HHW WK

increase

firms,

behavior

activity has been

in annual

there
cash

acquisition.

For the managers

of

acquisition activity

successful

proportion

of

tested

for

individual

change

in their

control

and HHW

for the manager to maximize his/her utility.

significant

the

On the

of the managers,

alignments.

factors most

increase,

of HBs

since the

income.

in

stockholders

stock options play a greater role

relative to cash

incentives

and

Managers

firm value maximizers

stock and

their

and HBs.

the difference

stock and

should be

income

of HHW WKs

managers

stock holdings

after the
or HBs,

should be

stock options.
through a

This
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the

result

a higher
can be

scrutiny

and compensation

contest.

a

easily

of the

of through
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